Carrot or Stick? Contract Frame and Use of Decision‐Influencing Information in a Principal‐Agent Setting

A fundamental management accounting issue is how to incorporate decision‐influencing information (e.g., an ex post state signal) into employment contracts. Our experiment examines the effects of contract framing on such information use in a principal‐agent setting. In each of 40 rounds, participants (as employer and worker) negotiate a contract that specifies pay depending on an ex post state signal. State‐signal pay is framed as either a bonus or a penalty over two groups. The results show that the bonus frame facilitates information use, because of worker loss aversion. Although both groups initially underweigh the state signal, the bonus group quickly converges toward the optimal weight, whereas the penalty group persistently underweighs the state signal.     

HISTORY AND MEASUREMENT IN THE SERVICE SECTOR: A REVIEW

Economic Council of Canada, Employment in the Service Sector
Delaunay, Jean-Claude, and Jean Gadrey, Services in Economic Thought: Three Centuries of Debate
Griliches, Zvi (ed.), Output Measurement in the Service Sectors     

The October 1979 Change in the U.S. Monetary Regime: Its Impact on the Forecastability of Canadian Interest Rates

Subsequent to the October 1979 shift in monetary policy in the United States, interest rates in North America not only reached unprecedented levels but also exhibited unprecedented volatility. Using Canadian data, the authors show that anticipated quarterly changes in long-term rates associated with the rational-expectations model have remained small during this post-shift period. The authors examine three sets of recorded forecasts of long-term interest rates in Canada and note their failure to improve upon the no-change prediction. The “perverse” relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the subsequent movement in long-term rates exists in the Canadian data but is of only modest value in a forecasting context. The excess returns on long-term bonds implicit in the recorded forecasts of the level of interest rates vary sharply, yet there is little evidence that forecasters have identified a predictable component of time-varying term premia.     

GLOBALIZATION,TRADE, AND WAGES: WHAT DOES HISTORY TELL US ABOUT CHINA?

Newly assembled data show that, as China opened up to global trade during the early 20th century, its exports became more unskilled‐intensive and its imports more skill‐intensive. Difference‐in‐differences estimates show that World War I dramatically increased Chinese exports, raising the relative demand for the unskilled workers producing them. When the war ended, trade costs declined and China's terms of trade increased, further stimulating exports. A simulation of a dynamic general equilibrium model demonstrates that the effects of the war on China's terms of trade produces a decline in the skill premium similar to what China experienced in the 1920s.