International Accounting Standards for Line-of-Business Reporting and Oligopoly Competition*

Abstract. This article presents a model in which the impact of international accounting standards on product market competition can be assessed. Formulating the choice of disclosure rules as the first stage in a multistage game between countries and representative incumbent and entrant firms, we establish conditions under which an enforceable international standard to require line-of-business (LOB) reporting could lead to strict improvement in the expected national welfare of participating countries over the equilibrium that would otherwise be attained. Additional results consider the effects of changes in certain model assumptions and the addition of tariffs as further trade policy instruments. Résumé. Les auteurs proposent un modèle permettant d'évaluer l'incidence des normes comptables internationales sur la concurrence, sur les marchés de produits. Ils posent d'abord le choix des règles de présentation de l'information comme étant la première étape d'un jeu à multiples épisodes entre les pays et entre les sociétés en place représentatives du secteur et les nouvelles venues. Ils établissent ensuite les conditions dans lesquelles l'application possible d'une norme internationale exigeant la publication d'information sectorielle pourrait mener à une stricte amélioration de la prospérité nationale attendue des pays participants, au-delà du niveau d'équilibre qui serait autrement atteint. Les auteurs s'intéressent entre autres, dans leurs travaux, aux répercussions de la modification de certaines hypothèses du modèle et de l'introduction des tarifs douaniers à titre d'instruments de la politique d'échange.     

TECHNICAL NOTE : THE VARIABLE FINANCIAL INDICATOR IRR AND THE CONSTANT ECONOMIC INDICATOR NPV

The IRR (internal rate of return) and the NPV (net present value) are the two most common and important indicators in investment decisions. These two indicators, however, have intrinsic differences between one another. The IRR is a financial indicator and the NPV an economic indicator of a capital investment. The former gives the private investor's point of view and the latter the society's point of view. The value of ERR varies with the change of Financial arrangement of an investment. The NPV, however, does not but remains constant no matter how the financial arrangement changes. This paper uses an illustrative example to show their intrinsic differences and then describes a mathematical proof to substantiate the different natures of IRR and NPV.     

The Effects of Delays on the Stability and Rate of Convergence to Equilibrium of Oligopolies*

The stability of oligopolies is investigated using the Cournot strategy and a general output adjustment procedure. Information delays are incorporated in the adjustment procedure and their specific effects upon the dynamic stability of oligopolies is investigated. The stability of equilibrium for discrete models is unaffected by information delays and remoteness of planning horizons; however the rate of convergence to equilibrium may be slowed. For continuous models with delays, some restraints are required for stability.     

Inferring Transactions from Financial Statements*

In this paper, we embed the double entry accounting structure in a simple belief revision (estimation) problem. We ask the following question: Presented with a set of financial statements (and priors), what is the reader's “best guess” of the underlying transactions that generated these statements? Two properties of accounting information facilitate a particularly simple closed form solution to this estimation problem. First, accounting information is the outcome of a linear aggregation process. Second, the aggregation rule is double entry.