Secretary problems with inspection costs as a game

A secretary problem without recall, with given rewards and inspection costs is considered as a game of an opponent against a statistician. Probability distributions on the set of arrangements of the arrivals and randomized stopping rules are the strategies for the two players. We give a condition under which minimax strategies may be obtained in a systematic way.     

A tale of two gravities*

The flows of traded goods across countries are known to follow a gravity pattern: Their volumes are greater between countries that are larger in size and closer to each other. We find a similar pattern in the flows of territories across countries between 1870 and 2008. During this period, countries experienced inflows and outflows of territories, mirroring the international flows of goods. We find three other pieces of critical evidence supporting that the two flows interact through similar economic motives. Our findings illustrate the usefulness of international trade models for understanding international politics.     

Rawls’ Paradox

Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to the interests of the poor, though it is meant to aid them.

Upward and downward complementarity: the meso core of evolutionary growth theory

We propose that the concept of complementarity can take two distinct meanings in evolutionary economics: one referring to Adam Smith’s notion of increasing specialization and the division of labour, which we denote ‘downward complementarity’ (wholes into new parts); and a second type that refers to the discovery of emergent complementarity between extant or new components and products, which we call ‘upward complementarity’ (parts into new wholes). We outline this new conception and explore some of its analytic and theoretic implications.     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

DOES BOARD INDEPENDENCE MATTER FOR CORPORATE INSURANCE HEDGING?

We test the effect of board independence on corporate purchases of property insurance. We find that board independence increases the incidence of property insurance use but does not have a significant effect on the extent of property insurance use given that a firm decides to insure its assets. These findings are consistent with the argument that: (1) more independent boards view it necessary to have property insurance to manage asset‐loss risks and (2) excessive insurance or insurance purchases induced by managerial risk aversion and/or self‐interest does not benefit shareholders and so may not be supported by independent boards.     

The benefits of storage and non‐renewable resource price dynamics

Abstract Both the Theory of Storage and the Hotelling model play a prominent role in the study of non‐renewable resource prices. This paper combines these approaches by modifying the Hotelling model to allow firms to hold inventory in addition to in‐ground reserves, contributing three new results. First, inventory is more likely to be held if future demand and/or the marginal cost of extraction are uncertain. Second, the market price of the commodity is based on the Theory of Storage when inventory is held. Third, the optimal extraction of the resource is based on the Hotelling model.