News from the Monopoly Front: Changes in Industrial Concentration, 1992–1997

Comparing concentration ratios between 1992 and 1997 raises difficulties because the 1997 data are arranged according to a new industrial nomenclature. By comparing concentration ratios in industries where the definition did not change, it is possible to make comparisons of changes in concentration between the two years and to document the considerable changes in industrial structure in the manufacturing and retail sectors.     

Regulation, Vertical Integration and Sabotage

We consider the incentive of a dominant firm that supplies a necessary input to a Bertrand-competitive differentiated products downstream industry to: (1) vertically integrate forward, and (2) raise its downstream rivals' costs through non-price activities which we characterize generally as 'sabotage'. We examine these incentives both in the absence and presence of a regulatory constraint on the upstream price. We find that, while an incentive for vertical integration is present regardless of the existence of the regulatory constraint, the incentive for sabotage emerges only in the presence of binding input price regulation. Welfare effects are also explored.     

The Costs and Benefits of Long-Distance Entry: Regulation and Non-Price Discrimination

A primary goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act isto encourage competition in long-distance telephonemarkets. Four years after passage of thislegislation, Bell Operating Companies (``BOCs') havebeen granted permission to offer long-distanceservices in only one state. The regulatory barrier toentry is justified on grounds that the BOCs have theability to discriminate against incumbentlong-distance carriers in the provision of essentialaccess services. We take this premise as given andquantify the critical level of discrimination requiredto offset the positive consumers' surplus gainsassociated with the enhanced competition resultingfrom BOC entry into long-distance markets.     

Chemical market research: Passive and dynamic functions

In this article Mr. A. L. Waddams, Chairman of the EVAF European Chemical Marketing Research Association, presents his thoughts on the different ways in which market research can be utilized to advance a complex project. Two main interactions, between market research and the project, are considered: the first where the findings of the market researchers are “fed-in” and the project then proceeds without further collaboration from the market research team; and a second where market researchers carry some responsibility for furthering a project, in the light of the understanding they have gained from carrying out the research. Mr. Waddams coins the phrases “passive function” and “dynamic function”, respectively, for these different rôles of market research.     

Market Power,Efficiency and the Dispersion of Systematic Risk

A number of studies have used the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to integrate product market and financial theories of the firm. We reexamine the relationship between product market structure and systematic risk at the firm and industry level. We show that theory yields no testable implications at the firm level. We show, however, that there is a relationship between the intraindustry dispersion of systematic risk and industry concentration which depends on the causes and consequences of concentration. Estimates of the relationship between the intraindustry variance of and concentration for a 1987 cross-section of U.S. industries suggest that concentration allows larger firms to exercise market power.