Price Discrimination with Private and Imperfect Information

In this paper, I investigate the competitive and welfare effects of the improvements in information accuracy in markets where firms can price discriminate after observing a private and noisy signal about a consumer's brand preference. I show that when firms believe that consumers have a brand preference for them, then they charge more to these consumers, and this price has an inverse U‐shaped relationship with the signal's accuracy. In contrast, the price charged after a disloyal signal has been observed falls as the signal's accuracy rises. While industry profit and overall welfare fall monotonically when price discrimination is based on increasingly more accurate information, the reverse happens to consumer surplus.     

Chief Financial Officers as Inside Directors

Considerable prior research investigates whether the extent of insider presence on corporate boards is detrimental. However, the majority of past research treats all inside directors as a homogenous group. This study considers that issue in the context of chief financial officers (CFO) serving on their own company's board. Our research is important because individuals in different executive roles bring different skills and knowledge to board interactions, highlighting the potential for differential contributions. As prior research does not specifically distinguish CFOs from other board insiders, the potential benefits of knowledge sharing due to increased communication with other board members may have been masked. Specifically, the CFO is directly responsible for the quality of the financial reporting process and can therefore be associated with specific outcome measures. Our results show that the percentage of CFOs serving on their own boards is not large, likely due to the perspective (consistent with agency theory and reflected in independence guidelines) that company insiders on boards could promote their own best interest at the expense of shareholders. Contrary to this perception, we find that companies whose CFO has a seat on the board are associated with higher financial reporting quality (i.e., a lower likelihood of reporting a material weaknesses in internal controls or having a financial restatement, and better accruals quality). Yet, we also find potential drawbacks in that CFOs with a board seat tend to have higher excess compensation and lower likelihood of termination following poor performance, signaling greater entrenchment. While our results provide information to companies considering appointing the CFO to the board, both costs and benefits are demonstrated, and thus we conclude that each board should consider this decision based on its own circumstances and composition.     

The tortoise and the hare: the impact of employment instability on firm performance

The main objective of this study is to assess the influence of employment instability on firm performance in a sample of publicly traded firms. Competing theoretical arguments are considered with regard to likely outcomes associated with employment instability. A large sample of cross‐sectional time‐series data is then analysed using generalised estimating equations (GEE) regression techniques. Results indicate that employment instability is negatively associated with firm performance, although the relationship is also demonstrated to be quadratic (an inverse U‐shaped relationship). This suggests that the main relationship varies depending upon the level of employment instability. Industry characteristics are also examined as moderators of this main effect. The results suggest a disordinal interaction effect for industry differentiation, where employment instability is negatively associated with firm performance for firms in highly differentiated industries and positively associated in less differentiated industries.     

REGULATORY DEALING: TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION VERSUS ENFORCEMENT STRINGENCY OF EMISSION TAXES

We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in “exchange” for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58)     

ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES ON FIRM R&D INVESTMENT: A SURVEY

This survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public R&D subsidies and private R&D investment over the past five decades. The survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues. We aim to provide further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity. In particular, we emphasise a set of issues that, in our view, are critical to understanding the potential effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D spending. Special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm R&D, the constraints faced by the firm (such as financial constraints), and the amount and source of public subsidies. None of these issues have been investigated in depth. We formulate a set of research assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field.     

Robust influence diagnostics for generalized linear models with continuous responses

This article introduces two parametric robust diagnostic methods for detecting influential observations in the setting of generalized linear models with continuous responses. The legitimacy of the two proposed methods requires no knowledge of the true underlying distributions so long as their second moments exist. The performance of the two proposed influence diagnostic tools is investigated through limited simulation studies and the analyses of an illustration.     

Relevance of the disposition effect on the options market: New evidence

A moneyness‐based propensity to sell (MPS) measure, at the aggregate level, determines the propensity of option holders to exercise their winning relative to losing positions. Using data on individual stock and S&P 500 Index options, we find that the MPS measure has significant predictive power over the cross section of delta‐hedged option returns. We test the disposition effect in the options market based on a long–short strategy that exploits price distortions induced by the disposition bias. More pronounced evidence of the disposition bias is found for individual at‐the‐money call options than put options where the significance of abnormal returns remains robust across different subsamples even after we control for the portfolio option greeks and market‐based risk factors. The profitability of the long–short strategy is related to limit‐to‐arbitrage proxies suggesting that behavioral explanations help explain the positive relation between the MPS measure and delta‐hedged option returns.     

The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel

We study the collapse of collusion in Québec's retail gasoline market following a Competition Bureau investigation, and show that it involved two empirical regularities: high margins, and asymmetric price adjustments. Using weekly, station‐level prices we test whether collusion was successful, and whether asymmetric adjustments were part of the cartel's strategy. We do so in the markets targeted by the investigation, and in markets throughout the province with similar pre‐collapse pricing (cyclical markets). Our results suggest that stations in both target and cyclical markets adjusted pricing following the announcement: margins fell (by 30%/15% in target/cyclical markets), and adjustments became more symmetric.