The pricing of electricity futures: Evidence from the European energy exchange

This study investigates the pricing of electricity futures at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) over the period 2002 through 2004. To calculate theoretical contract values, the reduced‐form models of J. J. Lucia and E. S. Schwartz (2002) are used, and a thorough empirical analysis by means of an out‐of‐sample test is conducted for both one‐ and two‐factor models, incorporating a constant non‐zero price of risk. Although the models are proven to capture all basic spot market characteristics and provide an accurate in‐the‐sample fit to observed futures prices, the forecasting performance is subject to biases. For instance, it was found that the relative mispricing depends on both the spot price level and the remaining time‐to‐maturity of the futures contracts. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 27:387–410, 2007     

Bundling in banking — A powerful strategy to increase profits

Banks can learn valuable lessons from the bundling models developed successfully in other industries. Bundling core banking products with additional services allows banks to differentiate themselves in a generally homogenous sector. Bundling also increases sales across product areas and aids customer lock-in. This paper provides an overview of how to create attractive and profitable bundles through a systematic, multi-stage approach to customer segmentation, targeting and product positioning.     

Optimal delegation choices in the presence of an incongruent performance measure and double moral hazard

An owner‐manager can delegate two tasks to an agent. A time constraint prevents him from completing both tasks at first‐best levels. He can (a) perform both tasks personally to the extent possible, (b) delegate one task to an agent, or (c) delegate both tasks. Agency costs arise from a congruity problem, a double moral hazard problem, and a risk and incentive trade‐off. Delegation becomes more favorable the stronger the time constraint. Once delegation is preferred, the optimal extent of delegation depends on the relation of sensitivity to productivity ratios in both tasks. Agency costs not necessarily increase in delegation level.     

Regulatory impact assessment: a survey of selected developing and emerging economies

This paper reports on a survey of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) in 16 developing and emerging economies. RIA was playing an increasing role in these countries: eight had introduced RIA in the past 10 years; one had recently redesigned its existing RIA system; another had a long-standing RIA system in place. However, RIA was at an early stage of development in the majority of cases and six countries did not practise RIA.     

Do Lower Caseloads Improve the Performance of Public Employment Services? New Evidence from German Employment Offices

The caseworker‐to‐clients ratio is an important, but understudied, policy parameter that affects both the quality and cost of public employment services that help job seekers find employment. We exploit a large‐scale pilot by Germany's employment agency, which hired 490 additional caseworkers in 14 of its 779 offices. We find that lowering caseloads caused a decrease in the rate and duration of local unemployment as well as a higher re‐employment rate. Disentangling the mechanisms that contributed to this improvement, we find that offices with lowered caseloads increased monitoring and imposed more sanctions but also intensified search efforts and registered additional vacancies.