Privatization of public enterprises

In this paper the following results of a transition from public to private ownership are obtained: The manager of a public firm engages in less effort than is efficient; in a privatized firm the manager's effort is chosen efficiently. The reward to the manager of a public firm is more differentiated than efficient. In the case of an unfavourable economic environment the reward is higher than efficient. On the other hand, the manager in a privatized firm is always rewarded efficiently. It is irrelevant whether the public manager is incompletely informed about the particular mix of government's multiple objectives as long as the government chooses the incentive-compatible reward for the manager.

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Zusammenfassung Wird ein Unternehmen vom öffentlichen ins private Eigentum übergeführt, so gilt folgendes: Im öffentlichen Unternehmen sind das Ausmaß der Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen sowie der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers niedriger als im Kostenminimum. Im privatisierten Unternehmen werden dagegen der Arbeitseinsatz des Managers und die Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinvestitionen in kostenminimierendem Umfang gewählt. In der öffentlichen Unternehmung führt Informationsasymmetrie zu einer stärkeren Spreizung der Managerentlohnung als im privatisierten Unternehmen. In privatisierten Unternehmen ist die Managerentlohnung so niedrig, daß der Manager nur seinen Reservationsnutzen erhält.

     

The Influence of Riparian Protection Measures on Residential Property Values: The Case of the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds

The Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds encourages residential property owners to plant riparian buffers in an effort to reduce stream temperature and thus improve fish habitat. This study estimates the change in the value of streamside residential properties in response to planting a treed riparian buffer. A hedonic pricing analysis suggests that treed riparian buffers reduce the market value of stream-front residential property in the study area.     

Dini derivatives in optimization — Part I

This paper, published in two parts, is mainly concerned with general properties of Dini derivatives of functions of one and several variables and with some applications of this topic to the study of generalized convexity and generalized optimality conditions for mathematical programming problems.In part I the basic definitions and properties are given, with reference both to functions of one real variable and to functions of several real variables. In this part special attention is given to the restatement of the basic theorems of the classical analysis to nondifferentiable functions, in terms of Dini derivatives.In part II we use these derivatives in order to define some classes of nondifferentiable generalized convex functions and the class of generalized upper quasidifferentiable functions. This part concludes with the development of optimality conditions for a nonsmooth programming problem, expressed in terms of the tools prevously introduced.

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Riassunto Il presente lavoro, pubblicato in due parti, riguarda le principali proprietà dei numeri derivati di Dini (o derivate direzioni di Dini), sia di funzioni di una variablile che di più variabili, nonché alcune loro applicazioni allo studio della convessità generalizzata ed a problemi di ottimizzazione vincolata.Nella prima parte del lavoro si forniscono le definizioni e le proprietà fondamentali dei numeri derivati di Dini e vengono riformulati alcuni classici teoremi dell'an alisi, con riferimento a funzioni non differenziabili.Nella seconda parte tali derivate direzionali vengono applicate nello studio di alcune classi di funzioni convesse generalizzate non differenziabili e nell'ottenimento di condizioni di ottimalità per problemi (non differenziabili) di programmazione matematica.

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This research was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Scientific Research and by the National Science Foundation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Arts (grant OTKA 354/86). The authors have shared their work as follows: Chapters 1 and 3 are attributed to the first author, whereas Chapters 2 and 4 are attributed to the second author. The Introduction and Chapter 5 is common.     

Distortions,factor proportions and efficiency losses: Argentina in the latin american scenario

Zusammenfassung Verzerrungen, Faktorproportionen und Effizienzverluste: Argentinien im lateinamerikanischen Szenario. - Dieser Aufsatz verfolgt einen doppelten Zweck. Erstens werden Faktormarktverzerrungen quantitativ gesch?tzt und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Besch?ftigung mit einer Simulation ermittelt, wobei eine einfache Verhaltensgleichung des partiellen Gleichgewichts benutzt wird. Zweitens wird eine aggregierte Sch?tzung des Effizienzverlustes vorgelegt, der auf Verzerrungen auf den Faktor- und Güterm?rkten zurückgeführt werden kann. Die Analyse bezieht sich auf den gewerblichen Sektor Argentiniens. Anschlie\end werden die Sch?tzungen mit ?hnlichen Sch?tzungen für andere lateinamerikanische Staaten verglichen. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, da\ von der Wirtschaftspolitik hervorgerufene Verzerrungen in signifikantem Ausma\ die Besch?ftigungsm?glichkeiten verringert und au\erdem zu beunruhigend hohen Effizienzverlusten geführt haben.

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Résumé Distorsions, proportions de facteur et pertes d’efficacité: L’Argentine en scénario latinoamericain. - Le but de cet article est de deux sortes. D’abord, l’auteur présente des estimations quantitatives des distorsions au marché de facteur et il simule leurs effets sur l’emploi en applicant une simple équation de comportement de l’équilibre partiel. Puis, l’auteur donne une estimation agrégée de la dimension de la perte d’efficacité qu’on peut attribuer aux distorsions aux marchés de bien et de facteur. L’analyse est faite pour le secteur manufacturier argentin, et les estimations sont comparées avec des similaires analyses faites pour d’ autres pays latinoamericains. Les résultats suggèrent que les distorsions induites par la politique ont réduit des possibilités d’emploi d’une manière significative et de même causé des pertes d’efficacité aux dimensions alarmantes.

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Resumen Distorsiones, proportión de factures y pérdida de eficiencia: Argentina en el contexte latinoamericano. - El objetivo de este trabajo es doble. Primero se presentan estimaciónes cuantitativas de distorsiones en los mercados de factures y se simula su impacto sobre el empleo, utilizando una simple ecuaci?n de comportamiento de equilibrio parcial. En segundo lugar se provee una estimation agregada de la magnitud de la pérdida de eficiencia atribuída a distorsiones en el mercado de factores y en el de bienes. El analisis comprende el sector manufacturera argentino; las estimaciónes son comparadas con estimaci?nes similares para otros pafses latinoamericanos. Los resultados obtenidos sugieren que las distorsiones inducidas por la politica econ?mica redujeron las oportunidades de empleo de manera significativa, y que también dieron lugar a pérdidas de eficiencia alarmantes.

     

Behavioral rules in the distribution of sectoral investments in Hungary, 1951–1980

An attempt is made to determine empirically the basic criteria for the distribution of the available investment funds among claimants, i.e., among firms or sectors of the Hungarian economy. Time series of investments in the 1951–1980 period and behavioral equations show that investments were determined by two simple rules that were applied at the same time in virtually all sectors: (a) investments were adjusted instantaneously and unconditionally to macroeconomic tensions; (b) the sectoral distribution of investments remained relatively stable.     

Some Difficulties in Sacconi's View about Corporate Ethics

Lorenzo Sacconi's The Social Contract of the Firm (Berlin, Springer, 2000) is a major contribution to the normative theory of the firm. It contains a full-fledged contractarian explanation of the role of Corporate Codes of Ethics. Sacconi proposes a game-theoretical model of the normative structure of the firm, including explicit and implicit contracts binding the members of the organisation, and the so-called constitutional contract: the hypothetical agreement that sets the basic co-operative structure in which the organisation consists. While Sacconi's theory is sound and full of suggestions, it is doubtful whether it completely grasps the nature of organisational ethics. In presenting organisations as the product of an agreement among self-interested individuals, the model does not account for the social and systemic embeddedness of business institutions. This paper points to several shortcomings of Sacconi's view, and explores alternative understandings of a contractarian morality as applied to business ethics.     

English mercantilist influences on the foundation of the Portuguese School of Commerce in 1759

The Portuguese School of Commerce, founded in 1759, is promoted frequently as the world's first official, government-sponsored school to offer formal instruction in commerce. This paper contends that Sebastião Carvalho e Melo (1699–1782), the Marquis of Pombal, was responsible for the transfer, from England to Portugal, of the educational “know how” instrumental to the School's success. Pombal was influenced by the English mercantilism he observed as the Portuguese ambassador to England (1738–43), particularly proposals by a writer on mercantilism, Malachy Postlethwayt, for academy-based commercial education in England. Another influence on Pombal was former East India Company employee, John Cleland. Pombal's motives were to imitate the success of British mercantilism, develop trade and economic activity in Portugal, and improve and expand Portugal's merchant class.     

Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost*

Indivisible units are produced with increasing marginal costs. Under average cost, each user pays average cost. Under random priority, users are randomly ordered (without bias) and successively offered to buy at the true marginal cost. Both average cost (AC) and random priority (RP) inefficiently overproduce. RP tends to overproduce less, but which game collects more surplus depends much on the demand configuration. We show that a key to compare the welfare properties of the two mechanisms is the crowding factor, i.e., the number of potential users over the number of units of output users can afford: The more crowded the commons, the more RP outperforms AC. In the quadratic cost case, beyond the threshold value of 2.4 for the crowding factor, RP strongly outperforms AC; beneath it AC only mildly outperforms RP. Thus the RP mechanism manages crowded commons better than AC.     

Factors affecting success in the professional entry exam for accountants in Brazil

This paper explores factors that have affected the success of candidates in the professional entry exam conducted by Brazil’s Federal Council of Accounting. We analyse results of 18,948 candidates who sat for the exam in 2012, using a logistic regression model and the key indicators used by government to monitor the performance of higher education institutions (HEIs) and the characteristics of candidates. We find that success is related positively to the quality of the HEIs from which candidates graduated and to a measure of student ability that is used widely in Brazil. We find also that males perform better than females and that younger candidates perform better than older candidates. The geographical region of Brazil within which candidates completed the exam was also significant. The insights provided will help public policy-makers in Brazil, and the Brazilian accounting profession, to understand key factors associated with current low pass rates.