Common Stock Returns in Corporate Takeover Bids: The Case of Brokerage House Acquisitions

This paper examines the common stock returns of three groups of bidders that purchased brokerage houses. Only in the cases of horizontal mergers, one brokerage house purchasing another, are there abnormal returns associated with the purchase. Neither bank holding company bidders nor non-financial bidders gain significantly when purchasing a brokerage house. Bank holding company bidders face considerable regulatory delays, and these economic disturbances may eliminate their gains. Bank holding company expansion into these non-bank activities does not appear, at the time of announcement, to either hurt or benefit them; hence, this expansion does not appear to further the loss exposure of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.     

A Comparison of Cost of Equity Estimates of Local and Global CAPMs

Cost of equity estimates are compared for three pricing models: the traditional local CAPM, the single (market) factor global CAPM, and the two‐factor global CAPM, with both market and currency index factors. For 2989 US stocks, the average difference in the cost of equity estimates is about 48 basis points between the local CAPM and the single‐factor global CAPM, and is about 61 basis points between the two global models. For 70 developed‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 76 and 47 basis points, respectively. For 48 emerging‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 57 and 70 basis points.     

Transforming Local Government: Innovation and Modernization

This article is based on research investigating why local authorities innovate and what happens when they do. The authors show how local authorities have responded to the current normative climate for innovation, and explore the interaction between central policy and local action. The article demonstrates the importance of the policy climate set by central government in fostering—or constraining—innovation at a local level.     

Polynomial approximations in cross-sectional models

The time-series distributed lag techniques of econometrics can be usefully applied to cross-sectional, spatial and cross-section time-series situations. The application is perfectly natural in cross-section, time-series models when regression coefficients evolve systematically as the cross-section grouping variable changes. The evolution of such coefficients lends itself to polynomial approximation or more general smoothing restrictions. These ideas are not new, Gersovitz and McKinnon (1978) and Trivedi and Lee (1981) providing two of the earliest applications of cross-equation smoothing techniques. However, their applications were in the context of coefficient variation due to seasonal changes and this may account for the non-diffusion of these techniques. The approach here is illustrated in the context of age-specific household formation equations based on census data, using Almon polynomials when the regression coefficients vary systematically by age group. A second application is provided, using spatial data, explaining the incidence of crime, by region; using polynomial and geometric smoothing to model distance declining regional effects.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐through and Currency Invoicing: Implications for Monetary Integration in East Asia

Exporter's price‐setting behaviour and currency invoicing play a key role in the literature on the new open‐economy macroeconomics. This paper estimates exchange rate pass‐through coefficients for the exports of four ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. In addition, previous estimates of pass‐through as well as invoicing behaviour in East Asia are discussed in the context of regional integration. The new pass‐through coefficients are estimated under two alternate specifications for up to 34 goods for each of the four ASEAN countries destined for up to 13 major markets. The results suggest: (a) little pass‐through is occurring in Southeast Asia and (b) this lack of pass‐through is more likely attributable to the fact that they are small countries in a relatively integrated market, rather than evidence of pricing to market. The implications for regional monetary integration of this apparently low degree of pass‐through are detailed.     

The composition of interest: The judaic prohibition

An interest charge is made up of an award for waiting known as the real rate of interest, a premium for risk and compensation for transaction costs. Where inflation exists the lender seeks further compensation. In order to understand the composition and evolution of different versions of the usury prohibition it is necessary to ask which components of an interest charge are prohibited by each version. The Judaic prohibition has two aspects which are of particular interest to business historians and students of usury. First, the general rule is that a reward for waiting is prohibited. This focuses on the time-based part of interest charge. Second, interest is prohibited because it amounts to placing a stumbling block before the blind. This focuses on the typical gullibility of the borrower confronted by a more expert, better funded lender. Economics confirms and enriches our understanding of these important aspects of the prohibition. They achieve this by increasing our understanding of two facts: first, that the borrower is a gullible individual subject to irrational and inconsistent behaviour; and, second, that this behaviour relates to the waiting aspect of interest which is proscribed in the prohibition. How far these insights apply to other civilisations' prohibition, particularly those which derive from the Judaic prohibition, merits further study; so also do the ethical lessons of the Mosaic rules for a globalised society based on capitalism.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE IMPACT OF PROFIT SHARING SCHEMES OF EXECUTIVIES ON THE CONTENT OF CORPORATE SUBMISSIONS ON PROPOSED ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

This paper examines the comments submitted by UK companies on 20 proposed accounting standards to test the hypotheses that executives favor standards that increase, or dampen the variance of, accounting profit numbers on which their incentive remuneration is based. Test results were generally as hypothesised but only the profit variance outcomes were statistically significant. Allowing for political environment changes affected only the profit variance results. There was no evidence that the relative monetary size of bonus payments was a significant lobbying factor. No significant differences were found between the lobbying preferences of companies with or without executive incentive schemes.