Incentive effects of benevolent intervention: The case of government loan guarantees

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.     

The Timing of Purchases and Aggregate Fluctuations

We study the cyclical effects of the timing of durable goods purchases in a general equilibrium model in which both durable and non-durable goods are consumed and the durable good is lumpy. At the microeconomic level, the timing of durable goods purchases supplies some insulation for non-durable consumption over the cycle. At the macroeconomic level, the timing decisions tend to amplify and propagate wealth and income shocks. Our model also allows for endogenous price determination. When the price of the durable changes due to inflexibility of workers between sectors, the effect of adverse shocks is even stronger and longer.     

Putting supplies at the bedside via the Friesen concept

Hospitals designed using the concepts of architect Gordon Friesen are especially conducive to reengineering for patient-focused care. The Nurserver, a closet-like space outside each patient's room, makes it very easy for hospitals to redesign their methods for delivering supplies so that caregivers seldom have to go more than a few feet to get what they need. In this article, staff of Monongalia General Hospital in Morgantown, West Virginia, describe how they have used the Friesen design to modify supply distribution processes.     

Investor efficiency in the face of takings

Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner.     

Managed competition

People don't like change. That includes materiel managers, administrators, and clinical providers. Managed competition or managed care will work if, and only if, the American professions and the American public recognize the value of highly educated and qualified clinical and nonclinical providers and if the health care industry responds in kind.