Mathematical formulation and exact solution for landing location problem in tropical forest selective logging,a case study in Southeast Cameroon

In Central Africa, creating forest roads and skid trails is one of the most costly and environmentally damaging operations for the forest's ecosystem. An optimized road network is essential for reducing construction costs and improving the sustainable management of timber resources. The location of landings is vital in the development of a future forest road network. In this study, a binary integer programming model similar to the uncapacitated facility location problem is formulated to optimize the locations of the landings. The model is applied to selective logging in Central Africa and tested on an annual logging zone in Southeast Cameroon. The results are compared to that of manual road planning, the currently used method.     

The Shrinking Hand: Why Information Technology Leads to Smaller Firms

We explain the firm downsizing trend of the recent decades by the new abundance of information – the ICT revolution. Production processes differ in their information requirements: while decentralized production by means of market exchanges is information intensive, less information per unit of output is needed in the hierarchically integrated production of firms, and the information/output ratio is decreasing firm size.

We formulate a quantity of information theory of the firm embodying these differences and derive a Coase–Rybczinski effect for the aggregate economy, which predicts a decreasing employment share of large firms and an increasing share of small ones when the aggregate quantity of information increases Panel data regressions and other evidence provide support for this hypothesis.     

The impact of unconventional monetary policy on the market for collateral: The case of the French bond market

We consider the channel consisting in transferring the credit risk associated with refinancing operations between financial institutions to market participants. In particular, we analyze liquidity and volatility premia on the French government debt securities market, since these assets are used as collateral both in the open market operations of the ECB and on the interbank market. In our time-varying transition probability Markov-switching (TVTP-MS) model, we highlight the existence of two regimes. In one of them, which we refer to as the conventional regime, monetary policy neutrality is verified; in the other, which we dub the unconventional regime, monetary policy operations lead to volatility and liquidity premia on the collateral market. The existence of these conventional and unconventional regimes highlights some asymmetries in the conduct of monetary policy.     

Are leniency programs too generous?

I present a simple model of collusion in which the competition authority offers leniency rates contingent on the number of firms that report information. The optimal leniency policy involves what I refer to as a single informant rule—that is, leniency should be given only when a single firm reports information. The single informant rule allows to increase expected sanctions compared to the first informant rule, which overall improves cartel deterrence.     

Information percolation,momentum and reversal

We propose a joint theory of time-series momentum and reversal based on a rational-expectations model. We show that a necessary condition for momentum to arise in this framework is that information flows at an increasing rate. We focus on word-of-mouth communication as a mechanism that enforces this condition and generates short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Investors with heterogeneous trading strategies—contrarian and momentum traders—coexist in the marketplace. Although a significant proportion of investors are momentum traders, momentum is not completely eliminated. Word-of-mouth communication spreads rumors and generates price run-ups and reversals. Our theoretical predictions are in line with empirical findings.     

Contrarian investment strategies work better for dually-traded stocks: Evidence from Hong Kong

We investigate the profitability of contrarian investment strategies for equities listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), which are separated into cross-listed firms and firms listed only in Hong Kong. We also investigate the relationship between stock returns and past trading volume for these equities. We report significantly higher contrarian profits for the period investigated and find that this is a persistent feature of stock returns for cross-listed companies. We also document that contrarian portfolios earn returns as high as 8.01% per month for the dually-traded companies and just 1.83% for only HKEX-listed firms. We find that volume has only a limited ability to explain contrarian profits. All extreme profits disappeared after adjusting for the Fama and French three-factor model.     

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

We introduce search unemployment into Melitz's trade model. Firms' monopoly power on product markets leads to strategic wage bargaining. Solving for the symmetric equilibrium we show that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade liberalization lowers unemployment and raises real wages as long as it improves average productivity. We show that this condition is likely to be met by a reduction in variable trade costs or by entry of new trading countries. Calibrating the model shows that the long-run impact of trade openness on the rate of unemployment is negative and quantitatively significant.     

Externality in labor supply and government spending

Standard business cycle models face difficulties generating (i) government spending multipliers exceeding unity and (ii) stabilizing effects of government size. Using a simple model with externality in labor supply, we show that a sufficient degree of complementarity between aggregate and private labor supplies is key to reproducing these stylized facts.     

The welfare cost of monopolistic competition: a quantitative assessment

This paper quantifies the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in a simple parametric class of endogenous growth models, embedding the neoclassical growth framework as a special case. We put particular emphasis on taking transitional dynamics into account. In doing so, we develop an original two-step numerical procedure to compute the value function. We find for conservative calibrations that the welfare cost of monopolistic competition can be anywhere between 0.4 and 1.2% of consumption, depending on whether labor is elastically or inelastically supplied.