Uncertainty and sustainability in the management of rangelands

We analyze a dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model of grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. The ecosystem is driven by stochastic precipitation. A risk averse farmer chooses a grazing management strategy under uncertainty such as to maximize expected utility from farming income. Grazing management strategies are rules about which share of the rangeland is given rest depending on the actual rainfall in that year. In a first step we determine a myopic farmer's optimal grazing management strategy and show that a risk averse farmer chooses a strategy such as to obtain insurance from the ecosystem: the optimal strategy reduces income variability, but yields less mean income than possible. In a second step we analyze the long-run ecological and economic impact of different strategies. We conclude that a myopic farmer, if he is sufficiently risk averse, will choose a sustainable grazing management strategy, even if he does not take into account long-term ecological and economic benefits of conservative strategies.     

Sample attrition and labor force dynamics: Evidence from the Spanish labor force survey

In this paper we examine a number of issues that arise in investigating labor force dynamics using the Spanish Labor Force Survey (EPA). These issues are by no means specific to the Spanish case and apply to most European-style labor force surveys. Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows. First, survey nonresponse cannot be neglected. Second, the EPA tends to underestimate employment and participation of high-educated young people, and to overestimate those of the low-educated elderly. Finally, we find little evidence that attrition causes important selection biases in estimating quarterly transition probabilities.     

Service Quality,Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector

This paper presents a simple model which illustrates the possible policy- and welfare-implications of endogenous product selection in the postal sector. The cost of a unit of mail depends on its "quality" (e.g., speed of delivery) and on the type and location of the addressee (firms, urban households, and rural households). Senders have inelastic demands and differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Addressees are passive but their utility may affect social welfare. Two operators play a two-stage game, first choosing qualities and then prices. We first show that the equilibrium with two private (profit maximizing) operators results in an inefficient provision of quality. Then, we consider the mixed (Nash) equilibrium with one private and one (welfare maximizing) public operator. If the budget constraint of the public firm is not binding, this equilibrium is shown to be first-best efficient even if social welfare accounts for the utility of addressees. If the budget constraint is binding, the mixed equilibrium is not efficient but yields a higher level of welfare than the private equilibrium. Finally, we study the impact of minimum quality standards within our setting.     

Accounting regulation, inertia and organisational self-perception: Double-entry adoption in a Spanish casa de comercio (1829-1852)

This paper analyses the influence exerted by compulsory mechanisms and cognitive and social factors on the adoption and implementation of double-entry bookkeeping. The study focuses on a small, commercial and family owned company located in Spain in the period 1829-1852. As our main conclusion we suggest that the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping in 1851 was influenced more by the managers' self-perception as traders, and the belief (internal and environmental) that the company must employ an accounting method appropriate to its new commercial status, than by State pressures derived from the enactment of a new accounting regulation in 1829.     

Exclusive Contracts And Market Power: Evidence From Ocean Shipping

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but relatively little empirical work. We employ the event study methodology to examine the competitive effects of exclusionary contracts in the ocean shipping industry, where they were the subject of an extended legal and political struggle. We find that some of the most important events in this conflict caused significant changes in shipping firms' stock returns, indicating exclusive contracts increased their profits. We then examine the effect of these events on net exporting industries' stock returns, and provide evidence that these contracts contributed to carriers' market power.     

Hedging Housing Risk in London

This paper investigates the benefits of allowing households to compensate the portfolio distortion due to their housing consumption through investments in housing price derivatives. Focusing on the London market, we show that a major loss from over-investment in housing is that households are forced to hold a very risky portfolio. However, the strong performance of the London housing market means that little is lost in terms of expected returns. Even households with limited wealth are better off owning their home rather than renting and investing in financial assets, as long as they are willing to face the financial risk involved. In this context, access to housing price derivatives would benefit most poor homeowners looking to limit their risk exposure. It would also benefit wealthier investors looking for the high returns provided by housing investments without the costs of direct ownership of properties. Comparisons with French, Swedish and U.S. data provide a broader perspective on our findings.     

Assessing the Least Squares Monte-Carlo Approach to American Option Valuation

A detailed analysis of the Least Squares Monte-Carlo (LSM) approach to American option valuation suggested in Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) is performed. We compare the specification of the cross-sectional regressions with Laguerre polynomials used in Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) with alternative specifications and show that some of these have numerically better properties. Furthermore, each of these specifications leads to a trade-off between the time used to calculate a price and the precision of that price. Comparing the method-specific trade-offs reveals that a modified specification using ordinary monomials is preferred over the specification based on Laguerre polynomials. Next, we generalize the pricing problem by considering options on multiple assets and we show that the LSM method can be implemented easily for dimensions as high as ten or more. Furthermore, we show that the LSM method is computationally more efficient than existing numerical methods. In particular, when the number of assets is high, say five, Finite Difference methods are infeasible, and we show that our modified LSM method is superior to the Binomial Model.     

An international study of internal audit function quality

We investigate organisational and environmental factors that influence firms’ incentives to develop high-quality internal audit functions (IAFs) by using a unique international sample formed by matching proprietary data from a global internal auditor survey with public data obtained from Worldscope. Concerning organisational factors, we find that a positive relationship exists between IAF quality and firm complexity and confirm that complex firms have a higher demand for monitoring and advising and, therefore, a greater need for formal controls. In addition, IAF quality is positively related to board monitoring and audit committee diligence but negatively associated with CEO power, which suggests that IAF quality is influenced by other key players in corporate governance. Regarding environmental factors, we document that IAF quality is positively associated with industry competition, which implies that a firm’s incentive for a high-quality IAF is enhanced when confronted with greater environmental uncertainty. Furthermore, IAF quality has a significantly positive relationship with our self-constructed index of IAF requirements included in national corporate governance codes, which indicates that strong home-country corporate governance codes play a role in fostering IAF development.     

Debt contracts in the presence of performance manipulation

Empirical evidence suggests that firms often manipulate reported numbers to avoid debt covenant violations. We study how a firm’s ability to manipulate reports affects the terms of its debt contracts and the resulting investment and manipulation decisions that the firm implements. Our model generates novel empirical predictions regarding the use and the level of debt covenant, the interest rate, the efficiency of investment decisions, and the likelihood of covenant violations. For example, the model predicts that the optimal debt contract for firms with relatively strong (weak) corporate governance (i.e., cost of manipulation) induces overinvestment (underinvestment). Moreover, for firms with strong (weak) corporate governance, an increase in corporate governance quality leads to tighter (looser) covenant, more (less) frequent covenant violations and lower (higher) interest rate. Our model highlights that the interest rate, which is a common proxy for the cost of debt, neither accounts for the distortion of investment efficiency nor the expected manipulation costs arising under debt financing. We propose a measure of cost of debt capital that accounts for these effects.