Digging deeper or piling it higher? Implicit measurement in organizational behavior and human resource management

Organizational researchers can dig deeper into peoples' thoughts, attitudes, and self-concepts to understand how automatic processes may impact judgment and social behavior in organizations. Measures of these automatic processes, including the Implicit Association Test (e.g., IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), Semantic Priming (e.g., SP; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997), Affect Misattribution Procedure (e.g., AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005), Word Completion Tasks (e.g., WCT; Johnson & Saboe, 2011), among many others, deserve greater attention as alternatives or supplements to traditional self-report measures of variables important in organizations (e.g., job satisfaction, personality and trait measurement, diversity attitudes). In this paper, we first provide a primer on implicit social cognition and its relationship to automatic and controlled cognitive processes, discussing major types of implicit measures, how these might operate, criticisms of this approach, and how these implicit constructs may give rise to behavior in organizations. Second, we discuss models of automatic processes and explore their validity and how these may predict behavior. Third, we offer advice for selecting, constructing, and improving implicit measurements when used in organizational research to enhance human resources and organizational functioning.     

The asymmetry of judgemental confidence intervals in time series forecasting

In forecasting a time series, one may be asked to communicate the likely distribution of the future actual value, often expressed as a confidence interval. Whilst the accuracy (calibration) of these intervals has dominated most studies to date, this paper is concerned with other possible characteristics of the intervals. It reports a study in which the prevalence and determinants of the symmetry of judgemental confidence intervals in time series forecasting was examined. Most prior work has assumed that this interval is symmetrically placed around the forecast. However, this study shows that people generally estimate asymmetric confidence intervals where the forecast is not the midpoint of the estimated interval. Many of these intervals are grossly asymmetric. Results indicate that the placement of the forecast in relation to the last actual value of a time series is a major determinant of the direction and size of the asymmetry.     

Fifteen Theses on Classroom Teaching

The Southern Economic Association initiated a lecture series on teaching to be presented at its annual meeting. This paper, given on November 24, 2000, was the first such lecture. The editor invited the author to publish the lecture in Southern Economic Journal. Portions of the paper are the fruits of the author's more than 30 years of experience teaching economics. Parts of the paper are based on writings regarding pedagogy outside the discipline of economics. The paper puts forward 15 theses about teaching economics in the classroom. The theses range from propositions about why economics is a particularly difficult subject to teach to suggestions about how the classroom teaching of economics can be improved.     

A Dynamic Model of Export Competition, Policy Coordination, and Simultaneous Currency Collapse

This paper shows that the "price wars during booms" logic of Rotemberg and Saloner ( American Economic Review , vol. 76, 1986, 390–407) provides an explanation of contagious currency crises. The idea is as follows. When a group of countries relies on exports to a common foreign market, pressures for competitive devaluations arise. In response, competing exporters peg their exchange rates to the currency of their export market. However, it must be in each country's self-interest to adhere to its peg, and a common adverse external shock can make an existing (implicitly) cooperative arrangement unenforceable. Maintaining the arrangement requires a collective devaluation that reduces the unilateral incentive to devalue.     

Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders

Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures the existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but nonstandard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multisender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero‐profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high‐quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, compared to the complete‐information benchmark, the separating prices of both firms are distorted upwards when the degree of vertical differentiation is large, and downwards when it is small.     

Market and Welfare Effects of the U.S. Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act

This paper analyzes the market and welfare effects of the United States Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act enacted in 2001. The act mandates meat packers to report their transactions daily to a government agency and requires the agency to make a summary of those transactions available to the public through the Mandatory Livestock Meat Market News Reports. Considering the case of an imperfect packer cartel that uses trigger price strategies, this paper examines the impact of market information provided by the reports on equilibrium livestock slaughter and the welfare of the groups involved and identifies the determinants of the socially optimal level of information. A key result of the paper is that, even when facilitating collusion among packers, increased market information can be social welfare enhancing.     

The 1997 Asian Currency Crisis,Financial Linkages,and the Monetary Policy of Japan

The evidence is examined that excessively liberal monetary policy by the Bank of Japan, before and after the financial collapse of Japan in 1992, may have led other East Asian economies into “over‐borrowing” and speculative investments, prior to the currency crisis in 1997–98. The authors test for cointegration and Granger causality between Japanese money supply M1 and the domestic investment of eight East Asian economies and Australia. US and German money supplies are also used as a benchmark. There is strong evidence that there are long‐ and short‐run causal relationships between the Japanese money supply and the domestic investment of the Asian crisis‐inflicted economies prior to 1997.