Technology transfers and the clean development mechanism in a North–South general equilibrium model

This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.     

Standards and Institutional Capacity: An Examination of Trade in Food and Agricultural Products

The ability of developing countries to cope with emerging standards in food and agricultural products is influenced by their institutional capacity. This paper develops original measures of four dimensions of standards-related, institutional capacity: information, conformity, enforcement, and international standard-setting. These measures are incorporated into a gravity model to investigate whether these capacities offset the negative effects of Aflatoxin B1 standards on food and agricultural product trade. The results indicate that informational capacity and conformity capacity do indeed have such offsetting effects. The evidence with regard to enforcement and international standard-setting is less clear.     

Walter Adams and Chicago

Walter Adams is one of the strongest critics of the Chicago School of Economics. Yet he was trained at the University of Chicago. This article traces Adams' education in economics and delineates two distinct Chicago traditions of antitrust policy. Adams is linked to the earlier Chicago tradition of Henry Simons and, to some extent, Frank Knight. The consistency of Adams' policy views on antitrust is shown and the connection of these views to pragmatism and Jeffersonian precepts is argued.     

An Examination of Changes in Specialists' Posted Price Schedules

New York Stock Exchange specialists disseminate informationto market participants by displaying price schedules consistingof bid prices, ask prices, bid depths, and ask depths. We examinehow specialists update these price schedules in a simultaneousequations model. We find that changes in the best prices anddepths on the limit order book have a significant impact onthe posted price schedule, while the effects of transactionsand order activity are secondary. Furthermore, we show thatspecialists revise prices and depths differently, but find noevidence that they revise the price schedule in response tochanges in inventory.     

Problems of Bank Lending in Bulgaria: Information Asymmetry and Institutional Learning

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -