Auditors' Ability to Resist Client Pressure and Culture: Perceptions in China and the United Kingdom

Ongoing corporate scandal and audit failure raise serious concerns about the ability of auditors to resist client pressure. Based on a sample of 93 auditors from China and the United Kingdom (U.K.), we analyze the effect of specificity of accounting standard, level of auditor tenure, provision of management advisory services (MAS) and degree of audit market competition on perceptions of auditors' ability to withstand client pressure in audit conflict situations. We draw on cultural differences to explain differences in auditors' perceptions in the respective countries. Our findings are consistent with national cultural characteristics identified in the research literature. We find that U.K. auditors perceive specificity of accounting standards, auditor tenure, MAS and competition as less likely to affect decisions as to whether or not to accept clients' preferred accounting treatments than do their Chinese counterparts. Additionally while Chinese auditors perceive MAS and competition to be significant factors, they perceive accounting standard specificity and auditor tenure to be insignificant. For U.K. auditors, these results are reversed. The results may be relevant to international audit firms operating cross‐culturally and seeking to apply common audit procedures or codes of professional conduct in different national settings.     

On input market surplus and its relation to the downstream market game

Abstract In order to analyze the welfare effects of price changes in input markets – following for example a price‐fixing conspiracy – economists have studied the relationship between the surplus measured in the input markets and the surplus in the output markets. The latest results hinge on simplifying assumptions, which are relaxed here by linking the input markets surplus question to another stream of literature, which characterizes functions that oligopolists collectively, yet unintentionally, maximize. It is shown that the area under the input demands is equal to the change in a function for which critical points coincide with the equilibria of the downstream game. A particular case of these functions is the exact potential function.     

The Impact of Social Norms on Suboptimal Food Consumption: A Solution for Food Waste

Abstract

Consumers seem to have a reduced preference to buy fruits and vegetables with unusual appearance, products with damaged package and close to the expiration date, usually called suboptimal food products. However, this pattern of behavior is an important contributor to food waste levels. Interventions aimed at encouraging the purchase of suboptimal food are scarce, however, needed. Across two studies, we investigated the effect of social norms in driving suboptimal food consumption. Additionally, it was tested if food waste problem awareness is the underlying mechanism in the relationship between social norms and intention to buy suboptimal food. Results show that appeals employing social norms positively affect purchases intentions toward the products. Moreover, food waste problem awareness mediates the effect of social norms on intentions to purchase the product with an unusual appearance. We discuss how social norms can be used to tackle food waste and implications for marketing and policy actions.     

Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime

We study the structure of taxation in a sample of 100 democratic and nondemocratic regimes over three time periods. The results provide strong support for several regularities in the world as a whole, specifically (1) scale effect: utilization of each tax source increases as the government expands, (2) base effect: tax systems rely more heavily on relatively larger tax bases, and (3) administrative cost effect: lower costs of administration lead to increased reliance on the corresponding revenue source. We also investigate the role of political regime and find that democracies rely substantially more on other income taxation, possibly because this tax source requires a higher degree of voluntary compliance. JEL Code: H2, D72, D78, E31, E51, F13, P35     

Public sector performance measurement and stakeholder support

Over the past several decades there has been dramatically increased attention paid to measuring the performance of public sector and nonprofit organizations in the United States and elsewhere. Recent research has indicated that public sector and nonprofit organizations are responsive to performance measurement in both productive and unproductive ways. However, it is not yet known how stakeholders respond to this measurement. This paper makes use of a unique panel survey dataset of the population of elementary and middle schools in the state of Florida to directly investigate this question. We exploit the fact that Florida changed its school grading system in 2002 and study the degree to which private contributions to schools are responsive to the information contained in school grades. We find evidence that school grades can have substantial effects on a school's ability to obtain private contributions. We also observe that schools serving different clienteles are treated differently in response to changes in school grades.     

Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity

We use a model of vertical relations between two congestible airports and an airline oligopoly to examine, both analytically and numerically, how deregulation may affect airports prices and capacities. We find that: (i) unregulated profit-maximizing airports would overcharge for the congestion externality and, compared to the first-best, would induce large allocative inefficiencies and dead-weight losses. They would restrict capacity investments but, overall, would induce fewer delays; (ii) Welfare maximization subject to cost recovery performs quite well, achieving congestion levels similar to a private-unregulated airport but without inducing such large traffic contraction; this puts a question mark on the desirability of deregulation of private airports; (iii) Increased cooperation between airlines and airports provides some improvements, but the resulting airport pricing strategy leads to a downstream airline cartel; (iv) When schedule delay costs effects are strong and airline differentiation is weak, it may be optimal to have a single airline dominating the airports, but this happens only when airports' pricing schemes render the number of airlines irrelevant for competition.     

THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INFLUENCE OF MANAGERS: INDIVIDUAL AND SUB-UNIT PERSPECTIVES

This paper examines the extent to which managerial influence over group-interdepartmental decisions is derived from sub-unit contingencies or is due to more individualistic characteristics of the manager. Both individual and sub-unit perspectives are presented in a framework composed of seven power factors each of which is investigated empirically. The major finding from a survey of 142 departmental managers is that individual managerial expertise is more important than sub-unit-based power with access to and control of information being of equal importance. We suggest that the investigation of managerial influence from a sub-unit perspective alone may be insufficient and that, in certain circumstances, both individualistic and sub-unit perspectives should be taken into account.     

Performance criteria for production subunits in Australian manufacture

Forty-two measures of subunit performance are rated by 155 production managers, and these ratings are factor analyzed to yield performance criteria. Nine criteria emerged from this analysis and five of them are rated by the managers as significantly useful. One of the significant criteria suggests, rather surprisingly, that customer satisfaction is an important consideration to production subunit performance. The application of these results to managerial situations is discussed briefly.Dr Graham K. Kenny is a visiting Professor of Management from the Department of Management, College of Business Administration, San Diego State University; and Professor Alan S. Dunk is a Professor with the School of Economic and Financial Studies, Macquarie University. Thanks are due to John Brown, Bob Hinings, and John Waterhouse for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.