Eco-Dumping, Capital Mobility, and International Trade

A small open economy’s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution. The country produces traded as well as non-traded goods. Is it in the country’s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded-good sector? The answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use. Dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country. However, if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to (foreign) owners of mobile capital, the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded-good sector, the opposite of ecological dumping.     

Standortfaktor Arbeitsrecht: Die Bewertung durch ausländische Investoren

Die strikten Regulierungen im deutschen Arbeitsrecht gelten als Nachteil für Deutschland im internationalen Wettbewerb um Produktionsstandorte. Welche Bedeutung haben arbeitsrechtliche Faktoren bei der Standortentscheidung von Unternehmen? Wie bewerten US-Investoren das deutsche Arbeitsrecht im Vergleich?     

In the Twilight Zone Between Veracity and Lying: A Survey on the Perceived Legitimacy of Corporate Deception in Reaction to Ethical Dilemmas

In their effort to attain legitimacy, corporations are tempted to resolve ethical dilemmas that arise from conflicting stakeholder expectations by ambiguous and misleading communication. Such processes of organizational decoupling may in turn threaten corporate legitimacy. Therefore this article explores public acceptance of deceptive corporate practices that range between the poles of veracity and lying: They involve half-truths and concealment but no blatant lies and they neglect veracity only to conform to conflicting ethical values. The analysis builds on the assumption that specific types of corporate deception fulfill protective functions, such as privacy protection, self-defense, and social cohesion, and are therefore socially accepted. Results from an experimental online survey (n = 1,417) indicate that protective functions are ascribed to corporate deception, yet participants show only moderate levels of acceptance and advocacy on behalf of the corporation. Corporate deception is most likely to be perceived as legitimate when it serves privacy protection and when it involves altruistic intentions. These findings point out limits of organizational decoupling and emphasize the need for pluralistic ethics in strategic communication that provide a framework for the resolution of ethical dilemmas under consideration of situational conditions.     

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

Technology foresight using a Delphi approach: a Japanese-German co-operation

This article describes a joint project conducted from 1991 until 1993 by the Japanese National Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP) and the German Fraunhofer institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI). Some first outcomes, and different alternatives on how to use the data for trend interpretation and priority setting, are described.
The Japanese Delphi survey is conducted every five years and was first undertaken in 1971. In 1992, NISTEP and ISI agreed on a joint project. About 3000 Japanese experts were asked to answer more than 1000 questions based on 16 different technological areas. With financial aid from the Federal German Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) the Japanese fifth Delphi survey was replicated in Germany. The Japanese questions were translated and more than 1000 German experts responded to the questionnaires and judged the possible technological development within the next 20 to 30 years. The aim of this joint project is to compare the Japanese and the German answers in order to analyse possible differences and to understand the cultural influences on technology assessment.     

EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games ( Fischer et al. , Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.     

Current Foresight Activities in France, Spain, and Italy

Recent years have brought a significant revival of public foresight activities in many European countries, including France, Spain, and Italy. The French context is rather specific in the sense that public planning and foresight (prospective) are an old tradition starting in the early post war period, but was progressively abandoned until its international revival during the 1990s. The recent experiences combine a mix of methods including the experimental reproduction of foreign experiences for long-term science and technology foresight (allowing comparisons of the experts’ opinions between countries) and the development of a specific study of critical technologies in the shorter term with the direct aim of orienting and improving the microeconomic strategies in the country.Spain and Italy started their own tests of foresight procedures later. The diffusion of foresight approaches and methods is certainly influenced by cultural proximities between countries of Roman civilization, but the different national settings led to relatively diverse experiences. International comparisons reveal the wide variety of methods and implementations that can be contemplated at present in Europe—a living laboratory of public foresight experiences.