Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation

We consider, in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality, a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations. Under each contract, agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives. The transfer is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner by the next young generation. Different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income. In a steady state with social contracts in each period, the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts. Analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under Nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions, also steady state income and welfare are higher. Delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly: Net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare. In the second part of the paper, we study a game theoretic setup, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income, there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy. Social contracts coexist with private savings.     

Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement

For international environmental problems involving many countries, such as, e.g., the climate problem, it is unlikely that all countries will participate in an international environmental agreement. If some countries commit themselves to cooperate, while the remaining countries act independently and in pure self-interest, it appears to be possible to achieve a Pareto improvement if the non-signatory countries reduce their emissions, in exchange for transfers from the countries which sign an agreement. However, the paper shows that the prospect of receiving a transfer for reducing one's emissions provided the country does not commit itself to cooperation, tends to reduce the incentive a country might have to commit itself to cooperation. Moreover, if the disincentive effect of such side payments is strong, total emissions will be higher in a situation with side payments than in a situation in which the signatory countries commit themselves to not give transfers to free riding countries.     

The macroeconomic determinants of private equity investment: a European comparison

A strong private equity (PE) market is a cornerstone for commercialization and innovation in modern economies. However, substantial differences exist in the relative amounts raised and invested in PE across European countries. We investigate the macroeconomic determinants of PE investment in Europe, focusing on the comparison between Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Western European countries. Our estimations are based on a data set running from 2001 to 2011 that covers 16 countries. Applying robust estimation techniques, we identify a ‘robust’ set of determinants of PE activity in both regions. We find similarities as well as differences in the driving forces of PE investments in Western European and CEE countries. Our results suggest that economic activity, the inflation rate, equity market capitalization, unit labour costs, the unemployment rate as well the the institutional and legal environment are significant determinants of PE activity.     

Evaluating rater training with double-pretest one-posttest designs: an analysis of testing effects and the moderating role of rater self-efficacy

Abstract

Previous research on performance appraisal in Human Resource Management has found that frame-of-reference (FOR) training can improve rating accuracy. However, both the time-consuming development of training materials and the almost exclusive use of experimental evaluation designs limit the dissemination of FOR training as well as a better understanding of how and when it works. Therefore, unlike past research, the present studies used more general rater training materials and examined improvements in rater accuracy by means of a double-pretest one-posttest design. Study 1, using a student sample (the majority being part-time employees; N = 58), demonstrated the effectiveness of the rater training over and above a testing effect. Study 2 with participants from the workforce population (N = 45) replicated these results. In addition, in Study 2, pre-training rater self-efficacy moderated rater training effectiveness such that the rating accuracy of trainees with low self-efficacy improved more than did accuracy scores of trainees high in rater self-efficacy. We conclude that an effective FOR training can be conducted with less organization-specific materials, though both testing effects must be controlled for and individual differences (i.e. rater self-efficacy) between trainees have to be taken into account.     

Tournament Compensation Systems,Employee Heterogeneity,and Firm Performance

Tournament compensation systems are widely used in practice and have been extensively analyzed theoretically. However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy.     

Much Ado about Nothing? The Role of Primary School Catchment Areas For Ethnic School Segregation: Evidence From a Policy Reform

By the 2008/09 school year the federal state of North Rhine‐Westphalia (Germany) abolished binding school catchment areas in all municipalities. The reform has been controversial and it was feared that school choice would increase ethnic segregation. Using data on all primary schools we contribute to this debate by analyzing ethnic segregation before and after the reform. We discuss drawbacks of commonly used segregation indices and their interpretation as well as causality issues. Although there is an increase in segregation over the time period studied, our results show that segregation has not been affected by the policy reform.     

Consumers and the dairy growth hormone: Opportunity and controversy

International Advances in Economic Research -     

Energy taxation: Reasons for discriminating in favor of the production sector

If a small open economy wishes to restrict it's greenhouse gas emissions, it has to decide whether to impose uniform taxes on all polluters or to resort to a discriminatory policy. In practice, countries tend to impose higher taxes on households and to tax the industrial sector more leniently. This paper identifies conditions under which this is efficient. It is shown that an efficiency maximizing tax planner discriminates in favor of the production sector if (i) there are restrictions on the taxation of lump-sum income or if (ii) labor supply exerts market power.     

Electronic monitoring at work: The role of attitudes,functions, and perceived control for the acceptance of tracking technologies

Organisations increasingly adopt tracking technologies that allow managers to continuously collect highly detailed records of employee, performance, and health. On the basis of the theory of planned behaviour, we aim to identify attitudes, functions of monitoring, and control perceptions that should strengthen or lower employees' acceptance of these technologies. Our experimental vignette study among 800 respondents in Germany reveals that acceptance is more likely if employees have positive attitudes towards surveillance in general and towards monitoring in private life and if the technologies enhance labour productivity. The tendency to reject the technology increases if it is to be used for monitoring health and performance. The results indicate that these new technologies will not be accepted unconditionally and may be subject to bargaining and conflicts. In the implementation process, human resources departments will have to take account of employee interests and well‐being, which in turn may improve acceptance and performance.     

Was der Körper braucht

N?hrstoffbedarf sichern - Eine ausgewogene Ern?hrung sichert nicht nur die N?hrstoffzufuhr, sie sorgt auch für den reibungslosen Ablauf aller Stoffwechselprozesse. Die N?hrstoffversorgung spielt daher auch bei der Entstehung und Heilung von Wunden eine wichtige Rolle.