Economic Incentives and Foster Care Placement

Using micro-level data on children entering foster care in 1998, we estimate how the financial compensation paid to foster caregivers affects the placement of foster children. Controlling for observable child and county characteristics as well as for unobservable state effects, our estimates indicate that a $100 increase in the basic monthly foster care payment reduces the number of children placed in group homes by 28.7%, with more children instead going to nonrelative foster homes. Further estimates indicate that the children moved out of group homes are equally likely to be placed in two-parent and single-parent homes, but they are disproportionately placed with caregivers who do not share the child's race or ethnicity. Finally, a $100 increase in foster care payment will decrease the number of times the average child is moved from one foster placement to another by 20%.     

亚股反弹难掩美经济衰退阴云

在美国联邦储备委员会（Fed）22日出人意料地宣布大幅减息的决定后，亚洲股市23日展开反弹。不过，股市的强劲表现并未给大型机构投资者带来多少喜悦，他们担心经济萧条的阴云会令美国消费者捂紧钱袋，不再踊跃购买亚洲出口商品。     

Large economies with differential information and without free disposal

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis et al. in Econ Theory 21, 495–526, 2002). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (Econ Theory 18, 321–332, 2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then, motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution, we adapt the incentive compatibility property introduced in Krasa and Yannelis (Econometrica 62, 881–900, 1994) and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable. We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor for their valuable suggestions and remarks. This work was partially done while V.F. Martins-da-Rocha was visiting the Dipartimento di Matematica e Informatica of the Università degli Studi di Perugia. We thank the audience of the First General Equilibrium Workshop at Rio. Section 6 dealing with contract enforcement and coalitional incentive compatibility has benefited from discussions with J. Correia-da-Silva, W. Daher, F. Forges, C. Hervès-Beloso, E. Moreno-García, K. Podczeck, Y. Vailakis and N.C. Yannelis.     

Political institutions and economic growth

We analyze the impact of micro-founded political institutions on economic growth in an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over a public good (as well as in age). Labour- and capital taxes finance the public good and a public input. The benchmark institution is a parliament, where all decisions are taken. Party entry, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, and bargaining are endogenous. We compare this constitution to delegation of decisionmaking, where a spending minister (elected in parliament or appointed by the largest party). Delegation of decisionmaking tends to yield lower growth, mainly due to the occurrence of production inefficiency.     

A Test of the Resource-Based Model Using Baseball Free Agents

This paper examines a nearly untested premise of the resource-based view of the firm: managers can exploit uncertainty about a factor's true value to generate returns. Our results show that empirically validating this basic proposition is difficult and potentially impossible, despite our use of a rather simple empirical setting. While market imperfections appear to underlie the payment of baseball free agents, we cannot easily determine whether this imperfection constitutes a return or not. In addition, while we find convincing evidence of uncertainty underlying owner's expectations of a free agent's performance potential, it is not clear whether team owners can exploit this uncertainty by amassing superior informational strategies or investing in complementary assets. Our difficulty in testing resource-based propositions suggests limitations to the theory's practicality.     

Going Public to Grow? Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms

This paper investigates the consequences of the decision to go public for the growth of Italian firms using US firms as a benchmark for comparison. We find Italian firms conducting IPOs are larger than US firms, but raise fewer funds from the IPO and grow more slowly afterwards. We also compare Italian IPOs across time. Firms going public in the 1990s display features that are more similar to US IPOs. We describe changes to the Italian economy and financial markets that are potentially responsible for the change. We compare firms of different size and with different governance structures, and we find that they behave differently after going public. Our results suggest that going public does not guarantee faster growth or more jobs. As such, public policies that simply increase access to equity markets may not be effective unless they provide incentives for the firms’ decision-makers to use the new capital to grow.      

PENSION REFORM,POLITICAL PRESSURE AND PUBLIC CHOICE – THE CASE OF FRANCE

An ageing population and generous public sector pensions have put significant pressure on the funding of the French pension system making a reduction in the scope of state pension schemes imperative. Yet, as public‐choice theory would predict, lobbying by interest groups has made reform difficult to achieve.     

Does Technology Foster Trade? Empirical Evidence for Developed and Developing Countries

This paper aims to investigate the effects of technology on international trade flows. In order to do so, the authors use a composite index designed to capture the performance of countries concerning technology and human knowledge as a new explanatory variable in an augmented gravity equation estimated for a sample of 62 developed and developing countries. Results show that geographical factors are always relevant, however geographical distance, being landlocked, technological and social factors seem to be more important for the poorest than for the richest countries. Transport infrastructure and technology can be considered as barriers to trade for those countries with lower endowment levels, therefore investing in these variables will increase the participation of the poorest countries in the world economy.The authors would like to thank the participants at the 2004 International Atlantic Economic Conference held in Lisbon and at the VII Encuentro de Economía Aplicada held in Vigo for their useful comments and suggestions. Moreover, the authors acknowledge the support and collaboration of the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas.