Risk as feelings or risk and feelings? A cross‐lagged panel analysis

This article focuses on affective and cognitive processes underlying the perception of risk. A limitation with most process models of affect/cognition is that they include only concurrent emotions. By following a group (n?=?129) of military sailors prospectively during an international operation, we explored longitudinal relations between perceived risk and related feelings.

Longitudinal cross‐lagged path models were estimated to explore the relationships between perceived risk, worry, and emotional distress. Results gave support to earlier studies by showing that cross‐sectional measures of risk and worry were weakly related. Across time, worry and emotional distress were reciprocally related. Perceived risk had impact on worry but not on emotional distress. Neither worry nor emotional distress influenced perceived risk.

The risk‐as‐feelings hypothesis postulates a direct effect of feelings onto behavioural choice, and a reciprocal relation between cognitive evaluations and feelings.

Our findings do not support a reciprocal relation between judgements of risk and feelings, but an impact from risk on to worry. Between various measures of feelings reciprocity seems to exist. Further replications, including also behavioural measures, are needed.     

Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

A variant of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered, where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign, subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm's customers. Such non-discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome. This outcome is that of Miyazaki and Spence i.e., the incentive-compatible pair of zero-profit contracts, if efficient; and the incentive-compatible, zero-profit pair of contracts maximizing low-risk utility, otherwise.     

Coordinating under incomplete information

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Hans Carlsson, Ani Guerdjikova and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Part of this work was done while Asheim was visiting Cornell University, which hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.     

Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up

We investigate criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams that satisfy fixed-step anonymity and include some notion of overtaking or catching-up. We do so in a generalized setting that does not require us to specify the underlying finite-dimensional criterion (e.g. utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatizations that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one case is new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between the symmetric parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts.     

Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment

We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each individual’s utility depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earning ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a contract that offers less than full medical treatment. We find that high-ability individuals demand full recovery and equalize utility across states, while low-ability individuals demand partial treatment and cash compensation and suffer a loss in utility if ill. Our results carry over to the case where health states are not observable.     

On the epidemiology of injury in developing countries: A one-year emergency room-based surveillance experience from León,Nicaragua

Background Regularly available data has been shown to be inadequate for developing, implementing, and evaluating injury prevention and control programs in Nicaragua. A specific prevention-oriented local injury surveillance system has therefore been set up in the city of León. Objectives The aim of this paper is to describe the epidemiology of fatal and non-fatal injuries over a one-year period in a well-defined local population in Nicaragua, as emerging from the perspective of emergency room and inpatient treatments over a one-year period. Methods A hospital-based injury surveillance system was established to collect data for different levels of severity. All treated unintentional and intentional injuries were registered, including information on the external causes according to the ICD-9. Results Of all emergency room visits, 15.9% (9,970) were injuries. For every death due to injuries, there were 31 hospital admissions and 253 emergency room visits. Home and street/roads were the main arenas for the accidents. The estimated underreporting rate was about 6%, and in 20.3% of the cases, no E-code was assigned. The overall incidence and mortality rates were 56.2 per 1,000 and 20 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. However, comparison with a parallel household survey showed that the reporting rate of the surveillance system is only about 9%. The overall ratio of male to female injury rates was 2.1 to 1. The main causes of non-fatal injuries were falls, whereas the main cause of death was traffic accidents. Conclusions Hospital discharge and emergency room data systems are effective and feasible means for collecting the data needed to prevent injuries. However, in a country like Nicaragua with limited access to hospital health services, it is necessary to supplement such a system with additional sources of information in order to gain a more comprehensive picture of injury occurrence.     

The Extent of Overestimation of Small Firm Job Creation – An Empirical Examination of the Regression Bias

Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993; 1996a; 1996b) suggested that the belief that small firms are major contributors of new jobs is largely based on methodological flaws. In particular, their reasoning about the "regression fallacy", i.e., that temporary fluctuations in size systematically biases estimates in favor of small firm job creation, has caught on interest among researchers and concern among policy makers. In this article we attempt to estimate empirically the extent of overestimation of small firm job creation due to the "regression fallacy". It is concluded that the effect is very small and that correcting for it does not lead to qualitative change of the results. There may be good reasons to question to what extent small firms can lead economic development, and whether it is good or bad if they do create most new jobs, but concern for the "regression fallacy" does not seem to be an important issue in this context.     

Measuring Social Performance in Social Enterprises: A Global Study of Microfinance Institutions

Journal of Business Ethics - Social enterprises in the microfinance industry need to adhere to both financial and social demands. Critics argue that there is a mission drift away from the social...