Optimal auditing of social benefit fraud: a case study

Empirical Economics - The aim of this paper is to study the effect of different audit strategies on fraud in one particular social benefit system in Sweden. The efficiency of different audit...     

Non-discriminating renegotiation in a competitive insurance market

A variant of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of a competitive insurance market is considered, where each uninformed firm is allowed to renegotiate the contracts that its customers initially sign, subject to the restriction that renegotiated contracts be offered to all the firm's customers. Such non-discriminating renegotiation is shown to weaken the profitability of cream skimming to the extent that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome. This outcome is that of Miyazaki and Spence i.e., the incentive-compatible pair of zero-profit contracts, if efficient; and the incentive-compatible, zero-profit pair of contracts maximizing low-risk utility, otherwise.     

Coordinating under incomplete information

We show that, in a minimum effort game with incomplete information where player types are independently drawn, there is a largest and smallest Bayesian equilibrium, leading to the set of equilibrium payoffs (as evaluated at the interim stage) having a lattice structure. Furthermore, the range of equilibrium payoffs converges to those of the deterministic complete information version of the game, in the limit as the incomplete information vanishes. This entails that such incomplete information alone cannot explain the equilibrium selection suggested by experimental evidence. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Hans Carlsson, Ani Guerdjikova and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Part of this work was done while Asheim was visiting Cornell University, which hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.     

Measuring Social Performance in Social Enterprises: A Global Study of Microfinance Institutions

Journal of Business Ethics - Social enterprises in the microfinance industry need to adhere to both financial and social demands. Critics argue that there is a mission drift away from the social...     

Fixed-step anonymous overtaking and catching-up

We investigate criteria for evaluating infinite utility streams that satisfy fixed-step anonymity and include some notion of overtaking or catching-up. We do so in a generalized setting that does not require us to specify the underlying finite-dimensional criterion (e.g. utilitarianism or leximin). We present axiomatizations that rely on weaker axioms than those in the literature, and which in one case is new. We also provide a complete analysis of the relationships between the symmetric parts of these criteria and likewise for the asymmetric parts.     

Commodity prices and fiscal policy design: Procyclical despite a rule

Recent studies offer evidence of reduced fiscal procyclicality to commodity price changes in resource‐rich countries—a feature commonly attributed to the adoption of fiscal policy rules. We revisit this issue and find that, by controlling for global activity shocks while allowing for time‐varying changes in both fiscal policy and the volatility of shocks, this finding does not hold. To show this we develop a time‐varying dynamic factor model, allowing for a multiple of shocks, stochastic volatility and time‐varying parameters, and estimate it on data for Norway, whose handling of resource wealth is often cited as exemplary.     

International Debt Shifting: The Value-Maximizing Mix of Internal and External Debt

Abstract

We study the capital structure of multinationals and expand previous theory by incorporating international debt tax shield effects from both internal and external capital markets. We show that: (i) multinationals’ firm value is maximized if both internal and external debt are used to save tax; (ii) the use of internal and external debt is independent of each other; and (iii) multinationals have a tax advantage over domestic firms, which cannot shift debt across international borders. We test our model using a large panel of German multinationals and find that internal and external debt shifting are of about equal importance.     

Health insurance: Medical treatment vs disability payment

We present arguments for treating health insurance and disability insurance in an integrated manner in economic analysis, based on a model where each individual’s utility depends on both consumption and health and her income depends on her earning ability. When purchasing insurance, she may choose a contract that offers less than full medical treatment. We find that high-ability individuals demand full recovery and equalize utility across states, while low-ability individuals demand partial treatment and cash compensation and suffer a loss in utility if ill. Our results carry over to the case where health states are not observable.     

A Simple Improvement of the IV‐estimator for the Classical Errors‐in‐Variables Problem

Two measures of an error‐ridden variable make it possible to solve the classical errors‐in‐Variable problem by using one measure as an instrument for the other. It is well known that a second IV‐estimate can be obtained by reversing the roles of the two measures. We explore the optimal linear combination of these two estimates. In a Monte Carlo study, we show that the gain in precision is significant. The proposed estimator also compares well with full information maximum likelihood under normality. We illustrate the method by estimating the capital elasticity in the Norwegian ICT‐industry.