Implicit functional relationships between systematic effects in a general model of movement

In this paper some further remarks are formulated on a general systems model of movement developed by Alonso. In particular, implicit relations between systemic variables are derived, which results in the proportionality of all systems push and pull effects and the choice of a reference unit as numeraire. This results in a simplified reduced form equation. The approach is illustrated empirically using data on interprovincial migration in Canada.     

Unravelling the HRM–Performance Link: Value‐Creating and Cost‐Increasing Effects of Small Business HRM*

abstract The majority of empirical studies on the HRM–performance link report a positive story. The costs associated with the productivity rise due to high performance work practices (HPWP) have been largely neglected. The purpose of this study is to develop a conceptual framework that maps both the value‐enhancing and cost‐raising impact of HPWP. In addition, we want to pronounce upon their overall effect on financial performance. To test our model, we rely on a sample of small businesses. Understanding both performance and cost‐related effects of the implementation of HPWP is particularly valuable for small businesses since they often lack financial resources to implement HPWP and benefit less from economies of scale compared to their larger counterparts. Study results indicate that although greater use of HPWP is associated with increased productivity, this effect is offset by increased labour costs. However, we find an overall positive effect of HPWP on firm profitability.     

Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies?

Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in disciplining management. We find that, in the United Kingdom, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little disciplining and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by nonexecutive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in takeovers but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the United States, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but nonexecutive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G3.     

Lessons from the global financial crisis – the case of Mainland China and Hong Kong

Abstract

The analysis of the intertwined reactions of Hong Kong and Mainland China to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is considered in this study through the lenses of their stock markets. The GARCH-based analysis of stock market performance over the period December 2011–December 2014 shows that trade and equity sectors were the sectors most affected by the global recession; volatility was prevalent on the Shanghai stock market, whereas volatility persistence characterised the Hong Kong stock market. The results also show that the two stock markets recovered quite quickly. Tight controls applied by the financial authorities helped ensure some stability during the crisis.     

Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations

The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution since 1990 in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed countries. The indices indicate how the law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-coverage also allows us to draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate governance regimes across the countries.     

One-step ahead adaptive D-optimal design on a finite design space is asymptotically optimal

We study the consistency of parameter estimators in adaptive designs generated by a one-step ahead D-optimal algorithm. We show that when the design space is finite, under mild conditions the least-squares estimator in a nonlinear regression model is strongly consistent and the information matrix evaluated at the current estimated value of the parameters strongly converges to the D-optimal matrix for the unknown true value of the parameters. A similar property is shown to hold for maximum-likelihood estimation in Bernoulli trials (dose–response experiments). Some examples are presented.     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.