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91.
Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, nonexecutive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative evaluation of the role of these different parties in disciplining management. We find that, in the United Kingdom, most parties, including holders of substantial share blocks, exert little disciplining and that some, for example, inside holders of share blocks and boards dominated by nonexecutive directors, actually impede it. Bidders replace a high proportion of management of companies acquired in takeovers but do not target poorly performing management. In contrast, during periods of financial constraints prompting distressed rights issues and capital restructuring, investors focus control on poorly performing companies. These results stand in contrast to the United States, where there is little evidence of a role for new equity issues but nonexecutive directors and acquirers of share blocks perform a disciplinary function. The different governance outcomes are attributed to differences in minority investor protection in two countries with supposedly similar common law systems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G3. 相似文献
92.
Lucía Morales Bernadette Andreosso-O’Callaghan 《Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies》2013,11(4):375-392
AbstractThe analysis of the intertwined reactions of Hong Kong and Mainland China to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis is considered in this study through the lenses of their stock markets. The GARCH-based analysis of stock market performance over the period December 2011–December 2014 shows that trade and equity sectors were the sectors most affected by the global recession; volatility was prevalent on the Shanghai stock market, whereas volatility persistence characterised the Hong Kong stock market. The results also show that the two stock markets recovered quite quickly. Tight controls applied by the financial authorities helped ensure some stability during the crisis. 相似文献
93.
The issue of appropriate corporate governance framework has been a focal point of recent reforms in many countries. This study provides a comprehensive comparative analysis of corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution since 1990 in 30 European countries and the US. It proposes a methodology to create detailed corporate governance indices which capture the major features of capital market laws in the analyzed countries. The indices indicate how the law in each country addresses various potential agency conflicts between corporate constituencies: namely, between shareholder and managers, between majority and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and bondholders. The analysis of regulatory provisions within the suggested framework enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-coverage also allows us to draw conclusions about the convergence of corporate governance regimes across the countries. 相似文献
94.
95.
Antoine Faure‐Grimaud Eloïc Peyrache Lucía Quesada 《The Rand journal of economics》2009,40(2):234-257
We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium. 相似文献
96.
Lucía Garcés-Galdeano Martin Larraza-Kintana Cristina Cruz Ignacio Contín-Pilart 《Small Business Economics》2017,49(4):825-839
This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not. 相似文献
97.
98.
Using Real Activities to Avoid Goodwill Impairment Losses: Evidence and Effect on Future Performance
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Andrei Filip Thomas Jeanjean Luc Paugam 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2015,42(3-4):515-554
We examine whether managers postpone the recognition of goodwill impairment by manipulating cash flows and the consequences of such a strategy on future performance. According to SFAS 142, an impairment loss must be recognized if the reporting unit's total fair value to which goodwill has been allocated is less than its book value. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that managers delay the recognition of goodwill impairment in accounting books. However, past literature is silent on how managers convince various gatekeepers (e.g., auditors, financial analysts) that recognizing an impairment loss is unnecessary although it seems economically justified. SFAS 142 requires managers to forecast future cash flows to justify the decision to recognize, or not, an impairment loss. Therefore, we predict that managers manipulate upward current cash flows to support their choice to avoid reporting an impairment loss. We also test whether or not this real earnings management is detrimental to future performance. Based on a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2011, we document that firms suspected of postponing goodwill impairment losses exhibit significantly positive discretionary cash flows compared to various control groups. We also find that this real activities manipulation is detrimental to future performance. 相似文献
99.
We investigate the impact of IT diffusion on the stability of employment. We document the evolution of different components of job instability over a panel of 348 cities in France, from the mid‐1970s to the early 2000s. The evidence goes against the view that the diffusion of IT has spurred job instability. Yet, analysing long‐term differences in the occupational structure, we find that IT diffusion has increased the share of high‐skill occupations at the expense of low‐skill occupations. This is consistent with French firms' reliance on their internal labour market to meet the new skill requirements associated with IT diffusion. 相似文献
100.
Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that did not around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests that contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of gross domestic product per annum. 相似文献