Testing differences in efficiency of regions within a country: the case of Ukraine

In this paper we synthesize and adopt the recently developed methods in efficiency analysis to the case of comparison of regions within a country. We take Ukrainian regions as a subject of investigation, yet the same toolkit can be applied to test disputable differences in productivity for many other countries where such questions can be of national concern (e.g., Belgium, Great Britain, Spain, etc.). Contrary to common perception of economists focusing on Ukraine, we find no significant differences in distributions and aggregate efficiencies between the agricultural and industrial regions, neither between western (mostly Ukrainian speaking) and eastern (mostly Russian speaking) regions of Ukraine. However, we find strong support for a rapidly increasing gap between the capital (Kyiv) and all the regions since 2001. Using truncated regression analysis with bootstrap we also find robust evidence that the inefficiency of regions is positively related to alcohol and tobacco consumption, the amount of foreign direct investment and inversely related to criminality in the region. On the other hand, we also find strong evidence that amount of capital in the region and its wealth is positively associated with efficiency level of this region.     

The ownership of ratings

We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.     

The price of ethics and stakeholder governance: The performance of socially responsible mutual funds

Do investors pay a price for investing in socially responsible investments (SRI) funds, or do they obtain superior returns? This paper investigates these under- and overperformance hypotheses for all SRI funds across the world. Consistent with investors paying a price for ethics, SRI funds in the US, the UK, and in many continental European and Asia-Pacific countries underperform their domestic benchmarks by − 2.2% to − 6.5%. However, with the exception of some countries such as France, Japan and Sweden, the risk-adjusted returns of SRI funds are not statistically different from the performance of conventional funds. We also find that the underperformance of SRI funds is not driven by loadings on an ethics style factor. There is mixed evidence of a smart money effect: SRI investors are unable to identify the funds that will outperform in the future, whereas they show some fund-selection ability in identifying funds that will perform poorly. Finally, corporate governance and social screens yield lower risk-adjusted returns.     

Using Real Activities to Avoid Goodwill Impairment Losses: Evidence and Effect on Future Performance

We examine whether managers postpone the recognition of goodwill impairment by manipulating cash flows and the consequences of such a strategy on future performance. According to SFAS 142, an impairment loss must be recognized if the reporting unit's total fair value to which goodwill has been allocated is less than its book value. A growing body of empirical evidence shows that managers delay the recognition of goodwill impairment in accounting books. However, past literature is silent on how managers convince various gatekeepers (e.g., auditors, financial analysts) that recognizing an impairment loss is unnecessary although it seems economically justified. SFAS 142 requires managers to forecast future cash flows to justify the decision to recognize, or not, an impairment loss. Therefore, we predict that managers manipulate upward current cash flows to support their choice to avoid reporting an impairment loss. We also test whether or not this real earnings management is detrimental to future performance. Based on a sample of US firms over the period 2003–2011, we document that firms suspected of postponing goodwill impairment losses exhibit significantly positive discretionary cash flows compared to various control groups. We also find that this real activities manipulation is detrimental to future performance.     

IT‐Based Technical Change and Job Instability

We investigate the impact of IT diffusion on the stability of employment. We document the evolution of different components of job instability over a panel of 348 cities in France, from the mid‐1970s to the early 2000s. The evidence goes against the view that the diffusion of IT has spurred job instability. Yet, analysing long‐term differences in the occupational structure, we find that IT diffusion has increased the share of high‐skill occupations at the expense of low‐skill occupations. This is consistent with French firms' reliance on their internal labour market to meet the new skill requirements associated with IT diffusion.     

Reaping the Fruits of Science: Comparing Exploitations of a Scientific Breakthrough in European Innovation Systems

This paper is an attempt to unpack the emergence and dynamics of science-based technologies in conceptual forms that allow us to understand better when and how the social and economic organization of search and problem-solving matters. The evolution over two decades of a specific science-based technology is mapped with data from its 192 patents. For the five European countries generating the majority of patents, we identify the host organizations of all 275 inventors involved in the R&D behind the patents. Using network analysis we then map the evolution of separate innovation systems and their structural and evolutionary characteristics. The best performing system combines a cumulative pattern with frequent and shifting connections to non-system R&D partners while maintaining a small core of almost omnipresent inventor-organizations. The role of multinational corporations in orchestrating innovation systems is apparent.     

Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions

Using novel indicators of political connections constructed from campaign contribution data, we show that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to (elected) federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that did not around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests that contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. Using a firm fixed effects framework to mitigate the risk that unobserved firm characteristics distort the results, we find that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. We estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of gross domestic product per annum.     

Spillover of corporate governance standards in cross-border mergers and acquisitions

In cross-border acquisitions, the differences between the bidder and target corporate governance (measured by newly constructed indices capturing shareholder, minority shareholder, and creditor protection) have an important impact on the takeover returns. Our country-level corporate governance indices capture the changes in the quality of the national corporate governance regulations over the past 15 years. When the bidder is from a country with a strong shareholder orientation (relative to the target), part of the total synergy value of the takeover may result from the improvement in the governance of the target assets. In full takeovers, the corporate governance regulation of the bidder is imposed on the target (the positive spillover by law hypothesis). In partial takeovers, the improvement in the target corporate governance may occur on voluntary basis (the spillover by control hypothesis). Our empirical analysis corroborates both spillover effects. In contrast, when the bidder is from a country with poorer shareholder protection, the negative spillover by law hypothesis states that the anticipated takeover gains will be lower as the poorer corporate governance regime of the bidder will be imposed on the target. The alternative bootstrapping hypothesis argues that poor-governance bidders voluntarily bootstrap to the better-governance regime of the target. We do find support for the bootstrapping effect.     

The Equity Market Risk Premium and the Valuation of Overseas Investments

There is little agreement among academics or practitioners about how to measure the size of the equity market risk premium, particularly when it relates to investments in emerging markets. Using monthly equity returns for 22 developed and 24 emerging markets covering the period 1976–2006, the authors find that developed capital markets have experienced significant increases in their degree of integration with the U.S. and world market indexes, while emerging markets remain at least partly segmented from those of the U.S. and the world. For countries that are reasonably well integrated into global capital markets, the authors suggest using the U.S.—based equity market risk premium. But when valuing investments in emerging markets, they recommend use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model adjusted for political risk and a measure of co‐movement between the foreign and U.S. stock markets. The authors also remind readers that the equity market risk premium is supposed to be a forward‐looking measure, and that the common practice of inferring the future from the past can be misleading, particularly in the case of rapidly developing emerging markets.