Storm surge disaster risk management: the Xynthia case study in France

In recent years, a series of catastrophic storm surges have occurred in Europe. The large number of fatalities and high material damage are mainly due to an increase in vulnerability and exposure to coastal flooding of hit regions. It is, therefore, necessary to intensify research activities in order to better understand this kind of disasters, to reduce their impacts and to reinforce risk management. This study describes the consequences of Xynthia windstorm that hit France in 2010: strong wind gusts, associated to high-coefficient tides and very low pressure, caused a phenomenon of storm surge in the Atlantic coastal area of France. Sea walls, lacking maintenance and originally built to defend agricultural land, were not able to protect houses. Fourty-seven people were killed, most of them from drowning, and direct losses amounted to more than 2.5?billion Euros. Around 10,000 people were forced to evacuate after the inundation of their properties. Uncontrolled urbanization was involved in the increase of stakes, as demonstrated by the fact that all the 29 victims in the city of la Faute-sur-Mer were living in houses built after 1980. The paper describes the event considering the aspect of increased vulnerability in the affected area, the lack of preparedness that exacerbated the final damage, the emergency response phases and the adaptation strategies adopted by the French Government after the disaster. We conclude that an attentive governance should include a balanced approach to risk protection, to reduce vulnerability and exposure.     

HR practices and affective organisational commitment: (when) does HR differentiation pay off?

We argue that differentiating HR practices across employees leads employees to compare their situation with colleagues to assess the favourability of HR practice outcomes (e.g. money). These perceptions can be negative (i.e. feeling set back), neutral (i.e. feeling treated the same) or positive (i.e. feeling advantaged). Data from 13,639 Belgian employees showed that perceived favourability of HR practice outcomes is positively associated with affective organisational commitment, but the relationship is attenuated at positive levels. Thus, differentiation may be a double‐edged sword as the losses among employees feeling set back may temper, neutralise or even outweigh the benefits among those feeling advantaged. The relationships found were especially salient for work practices (e.g. autonomy) compared with economic practices (e.g. bonuses). Developmental practices were found to be least suited for differentiation across employees. No evidence of a moderating role of employees’ preference for equality (vs. differentiation) was found.     

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随着企业对性能、成本和能源控制方面的要求越来越高,一种能够有效共享资源、应用程序、软件和信息的平台——云计算技术应运而生。为了在有线或无线基础设施上充分发挥分布式计算模式的优势,企业和云服务供应商都需要可靠和高性能的智能物理网络层,以便在所需环境中实现可管理性和可快速扩展性。     

“人类技术”:丹尼埃尔·G·安杜哈

"人类技术"(Technologies To The People,下称TTTP)于1996年问世,当时它作为展览"反调——现实的毁灭"的一部分,在汉堡艺术协会和汉堡美术馆展出。起初,"人类技术"呈现给众人的是一个致力于将先进的科技带给下层社会的虚拟企业形象,以及一系列模糊的企业形象,展览效果极具威慑力。展览中的这些身份认知的动摇、视觉原型都与信息时代中的商业公司有关。数字科技发展的初始阶段,上市公司所持股票贬值,企业形     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.     

International portfolio diversification benefits: Cross-country evidence from a local perspective

We investigate how the benefits of international portfolio diversification differ across countries from the perspective of a local investor. We find that the benefits of investing abroad are largest for investors in developing countries, including when controlling for currency effects. Most of the benefits are obtained from investing outside the region of the home country. These global diversification benefits remain large when controlling for short-sales constraints in developing stock markets. The gains from international portfolio diversification appear to be largest for countries with high country risk. In addition to this cross-sectional evidence, we also provide evidence that diversification benefits vary over time as country risk changes. We find that diversification benefits have decreased for most countries in our sample over the past two decades.     

The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation

We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, there are in reality many cases in which remuneration contracts are de facto senior to debt claims in financially distressed firms and in workouts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a “contract substitution” effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’ claims and creditors’ claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. If managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms.