Seven Ways to Deal with a Financial Crisis: Cross‐Country Experience and Policy Implications1

This article presents a taxonomy of financial restructuring strategies that have been used by national policy makers to manage financial crises in the past. The goals of financial restructuring are to preserve or, if necessary, restore the debtor‐creditor relationships on which the economy depends for efficient allocation of capital, and to do so at minimal cost. Costs include not only the direct costs to taxpayers of financial assistance, but also—and likely more important—the indirect costs to the economy that stem from misallocations of capital and incentive problems resulting from the restructuring. Countries typically apply a combination of tools, including decentralized, market‐based mechanisms as well as government‐managed programs. Market‐based strategies generally aim to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and borrowers using some mix of debt forgiveness and capital infusions. Government‐led restructuring strategies include the establishment of entities to which non‐performing loans are transferred as well as government‐assisted sales of domestic financial institutions, often to foreign entrants. Market‐based mechanisms can provide low‐cost ways of resolving the coordination problems faced by countries in the wake of massive debtor and creditor insolvency, particularly when those mechanisms are effective in achieving the desirable objective of selectivity—that is, devoting taxpayer resources only to those borrowers and banks that, with temporary assistance, will be capable of sustaining themselves in the future. But limiting their range of application mainly to developed economies, such market‐based mechanisms also depend on an efficient judicial system, a credible supervisory framework and authority with sufficient enforcement capacity, and lack of corruption in implementation. Although government‐managed programs may not seem to depend as heavily on well‐functioning legal and regulatory institutions, such approaches—especially the transfer of assets to government‐owned asset management companies—also rely to some extent on such institutions. Asset management companies are less likely to achieve their goal of resolving the overhang of debt at reasonable cost when legal and political institutions are weak and ownership of domestic creditors and debtors is highly concentrated. Especially in such cases, complexity and failure to consider incentive problems when designing specific rules governing financial assistance can aggravate moral hazard problems, unnecessarily raising the costs of resolution. Resolution mechanisms tend to be most successful when—like across‐the‐board debt forgiveness programs implemented through redenominations of debt—they are simple in design and afford quick resolution of outstanding debts, offering little discretion to governments while providing incentives for the private sector to work down the remaining debt overhang.     

Stadiums and Scheduling: Measuring Deadweight Losses in the Victorian Football League, 1920–70

Over a 50 year period, Australian Rules football's major league, the Victorian Football League, did not always use its largest and best-equipped stadium for regular season games between its most popular teams or schedule those teams to play twice in a regular season. We calculate deadweight losses from the use of capital goods (stadiums) and effects of match scheduling in this professional sports league. Such analysis has not been attempted previously because of the absence of a counterfactual. The welfare losses were significant but not sufficient to threaten the survival of a distance-protected cartel.     

Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agencyproblems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100%small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combinedwith small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empiricalvalidity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listedfirms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market valueof firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms witha single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, therelationship between corporate valuations and the distributionof cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistentwith the predictions of recent theoretical models.     

Examining the Patterns of Goodwill Impairments in Europe and the US

We examine the patterns of goodwill impairments in Europe and in the US over the period from 2006 to 2015, for a sample of more than 35,000 firm-year observations. We define the timeliness of goodwill impairments as the frequency of accounting impairments conditional to indications of economic impairments. We measure indications of economic impairment with three metrics: equity market value minus equity book value less than goodwill, market-to-book smaller than one and negative earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). Our research strategy leads us to draw very different conclusions than those in the recent EFRAG (2016) study. While median levels of goodwill on the books between US and European firms are relatively similar, we find several indications that US firms recognise timelier impairments, at least during 2008 and 2009, that is, the early years of the financial crisis. We further document that US impairers write down a much greater percentage of their beginning balance of goodwill than European impairers. During the financial crisis, the median level of impairment by US firms was 63% of opening goodwill in 2008 and 40% in 2009, whereas median European write-downs were only 6% and 7% of opening goodwill, respectively. Even though European firms are more likely to impair over multiple years, the cumulative impairments never come close to the level of US firms, be it in a single year or cumulative over multiple years. We also find that the frequency of accounting impairment is small compared to the number of firms presenting evidence of economic impairment: only 20–25% of firms recognise impairments depending on the measure of economic impairment. This has often been interpreted by academics as a sign of untimely write-offs. Accounting differences between US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and International Financial Reporting Standards are unlikely to explain our results. One caveat of our analysis is that it does not allow us to draw conclusions on whether the observed differences between US and European firms are driven by differences in conditional conservatism and/or big bath accounting practices.     

IMF Bank-Restructuring Efficiency Outcomes: Evidence from East Asia

We report new findings on bank efficiency in East Asian countries for the pre- and post-IMF restructuring periods. We find that bank efficiency has improved, but only to the pre-IMF intervention level, and that restructured banks are not more efficient than their unrestructured counterparts. Different restructuring measures have different effects. Bank closures are economically justified, but mergers show short-term efficiency losses. Recapitalization and reprivatization of badly performing banks lead to efficiency improvement, but also increase government ownership. Ease of entry that has allowed for more foreign bank participation results in slightly improved performance of badly performing banks.

Building pragmatist theories of PM practice: Theorizing the act of project management

This article examines project management through the lens of practice. Drawing on the literature, we develop a typological model that brings together four distinct theoretical types of project management practice. Adopting a deliberately critical perspective, we show that the first three types propose a weak conception of the logical relationship between the theory and practice of project management. In contrast, the fourth type, anchored in a pragmatist conception of the theory‐practice link, provides the potential to build strong theories of project management practice. A specific objective is to elucidate the distinct features of the fourth type of theory.     

Slack-based directional distance function in the presence of bad outputs: theory and application to Vietnamese banking

In this paper we extend the slack-based directional distance function introduced by Färe and Grosskopf (Eur J Oper Res 200(1):320–322, 2010) to measure efficiency in the presence of bad outputs and illustrate it through an application on data of Vietnamese commercial banks. We also compare results from the slack-based directional distance function relative to the directional distance function, the enhanced hyperbolic efficiency measure (Färe et al. in Rev Econ Stat 71(1):90–98, 1989) and the Farrell-type technical efficiency and confirm that it has greater discriminative power.     

The Effect of Joint Auditor Pair Composition on Audit Quality: Evidence from Impairment Tests

Using a sample of firms from France, where the law requires the use of two auditors, we study the effect of auditor pair composition on audit quality by examining a specific account, goodwill impairment. We document that firms audited by a Big 4–non‐Big 4 auditor pair (BS) are more likely to book an impairment and book a larger impairment than firms audited by a Big 4–Big 4 auditor pair (BB) when low‐performance indicators suggest a greater likelihood of impairment. Moreover, firms audited by a BB pair reduce impairment disclosures when they book impairments, while firms audited by a BS pair do not, suggesting lower transparency for firms audited by a BB pair. Our results inform investors and firms in mandatory joint audit regimes, as well as regulators who are considering requiring joint audits.