税收竞争还是税收输出?

原载:Journal of Urban Economics,第54卷,(2003)第639-647页一、引言在税收竞争基本模型①里,两个独立辖区政府为了相互竞争流动税基,把税率设计得很低,结果产生了无效率问题。典型税收竞争模型通常研究的是一系列独立辖区,其中每个辖区都在本区范围内对流动资本征税。征来的税款用来支持公共提供品,而这个公共提供品可能具有或不具有公共产品的那些特征。增加税收会带来资本的外流,而这种资本外流是提供公共提供品的一部分成本,尽管如此,我们并不考虑其他辖区拓宽税基这一有益的情况。由于所有辖区政府都采取相同的行为方式,所以,就会出…     

PRACTICES OF TREASURY MANAGEMENT IN A SMALL OPEN TRADING ECONOMY: THE BELGIAN CASE

There is little systematic information available on the current practices in the area of treasury management among companies outside the US. The purpose of this study is to investigate management practices in the areas of treasury management for companies located in a small open trading economy: Belgium. This article analyses and compares corporate responses in three important areas of treasury management, i. e. managing banking relations, domestic cash management, and foreign exchange management. The results presented in this article indicate that corporate practice in these areas could be much more sophisticated.     

How Country and Safety-Net Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting

Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This paper seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk-shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risk-sensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.     

Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

The ownership of ratings

We identify the optimal contract between a rating agency and a firm and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts implement this optimal solution. We assume that the decision to obtain a rating is endogenous and the price of a rating is a strategic variable. Clients hiding their ratings can be an equilibrium only if they are ex ante uncertain of their quality and if the hiring decision is not observable. For some distribution functions, a competitive rating market is necessary for this result to obtain. In this context, competition between rating intermediaries will lead to less information in equilibrium.     

Dividend policy of German firms: A panel data analysis of partial adjustment models

German firms pay out a lower proportion of their cash flows, but a higher proportion of their published profits than UK and US firms. We estimate partial adjustment models and report two major findings. First, German firms base their dividend decisions on cash flows rather than published earnings as (i) published earnings do not correctly reflect performance because German firms retain parts of their earnings to build up legal reserves, (ii) German accounting is conservative, (iii) published earnings are subject to more smoothing than cash flows. Second, to the opposite of UK and US firms, German firms have more flexible dividend policies as they are willing to cut the dividend when profitability is only temporarily down.     

Non-dictatorial extensive social choice

Summary. Different social planners may have different opinions on the well-being of individuals under different social options (Roberts, 1980). If utilities are translation- or ratio-scale measurable, or if the social ranking might be incomplete, or if interplanner comparability is allowed; then there exist non-dictatorial aggregation rules. We propose extensions, intersections, and mixtures of the Pareto, utilitarian, leximin, Kolm-Pollak, and iso-elastic rules.Received: 16 May 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D71. Correspondence to: Erwin OogheErwin Ooghe, Luc Lauwers: We are extremely grateful to the referee who was willing to review this paper many times. Her/his extensive and in-depth comments had a strong impact. Further thanks are due to Bart Capéau, Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles, Erik Schokkaert, and Alain Trannoy. The first author gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the TMR network Living Standards, Inequality and Taxation (ERBFMRXCT 980248) of the European Communities.