DEMOGRAPHY IN MACROECONOMIC MODELS: WHEN LABOUR SUPPLY MATTERS FOR ECONOMIC CYCLES

The issue of the onset of Malthusian cycles is investigated by means of a demo‐economic model incorporating the age structure of the population. It is shown that the delayed recruitment into the labour force is a major source of demo‐economic instability, potentially leading to sustained oscillations. We also compare different modelling strategies for age structure, by showing that the results of our general model are borne out by those provided by a simpler model, based on a representation of age structure via time delays, which allows a deeper mathematical analysis. This suggests that simplified delay models may be of great help in understanding the qualitative properties of complex age structure models.     

Value-at-risk Trade-off and Capital Allocation with Copulas

This paper uses copula functions to evaluate tail probabilities and market risk trade-offs at a given confidence level, dropping the joint normality assumption on returns. Copulas enable one to represent distribution functions separating the marginal distributions from the association structure. We present an application to two stock market indices: for each market we recover the marginal probability distribution. We then calibrate copula functions and recover the joint distribution. The estimated copulas directly give the joint probabilities of extreme losses. Their level curves measure the trade-off between losses over different desks. This trade-off can be exploited for capital allocation and is shown to depend on fat tails.
(J.E.L.: C14, G19, G29).     

Among leaders and territories: the political networks of the district councillors in Naples

This work describes the role of the district councillors of Naples, through an analysis of their relational networks. District councils are the result of the administrative decentralization of the major Italian municipalities. During a 2 year field research study, I gathered 387 semi-structured interviews with the councillors and 35 unstructured interviews with a set of key informants. In order to increase the understanding of the political networks, I have also collected information through direct observation of the councillors meetings and activities. The analysis combines qualitative and quantitative data. At a formal level, district councillors don’t have any actual power, but, in practice, they gain important social capital resources by playing a brokerage role between political patrons and their potential clients. I provide evidence that, on one side, they hold strong ties with the higher level politicians; and, on the other side, they play a fundamental role in taking care of the voters and collecting the electoral consensus. In conclusion, I argue that the district councillors of Naples perform the tasks which were previously carried out by the traditional party organizations, assuming the role of the “new” professionals of grass roots politics.     

ON INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE. A REPLY TO PROFESSOR RYZHENKOV

A recent paper by Ryzhenkov considers also a paper of mine, where increasing returns to scale are a crucial ingredient. According to Ryzhenkov, my specification of increasing returns is not correct. In this paper I shall show that on the contrary, it is his specification that is not correct while mine is well grounded in the main contributions to this field of literature. Further criticisms addressed to my paper will also receive a reply.     

Ambiguity aversion and trade

What is the effect of ambiguity aversion on trade? Although in a Bewley??s model, ambiguity aversion always leads to less trade; in other models, this is not always true. However, we show that if the endowments are unambiguous, then more ambiguity aversion implies less trade for a very general class of preferences. The reduction in trade caused by ambiguity aversion can be as severe as to lead to no trade. In an economy with MEU decision makers, we show that if the aggregate endowment is unanimously unambiguous, then every Pareto optima allocation is also unambiguous. We also characterize the situation in which every unanimously unambiguous allocation is Pareto optimal. Finally, we show how our results can be used to explain the home-bias effect. As a useful result for our methods, we also obtain an additivity theorem for CEU and MEU decision makers that does not require comonotonicity.     

An OLG model of growth with longevity: when grandparents take care of grandchildren

By assuming that grandparents take care of grandchildren, this paper aims at studying the effects of longevity on long-term economic growth in a model with overlapping generations and endogenous fertility. We show that an increase in longevity may: (i) reduce the long-term economic growth; (ii) increase the supply of labour, and (iii) cause fertility either to increase of decrease depending on the size of time spent by grandparents to rise grandchildren. These findings also hold in an endogenous growth setting à la Romer (J Polit Econ 94:1002–1037, 1986).     

Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between product market competition and incentives against shirking. In contrast with standard results, efficiency wages paid by each firm can decrease when competition (i.e. the number of firms in the product market) increases. Discretionary bonuses, on the other hand, do not vary with competition. There is an upper threshold for the number of competing firms, however, above which such schemes are no longer sustainable as an equilibrium. Industry profits with bonuses are generally higher than with efficiency wages but, when information regarding firms’ misbehaviour flows at a low rate, a competition range exists for which firms can make a positive profit by only paying efficiency wages.     

Latent Class Analysis of Consumer Preferences for Wine in Tirana,Albania

This research aimed to determine wine attributes preferred by consumers in Tirana, Albania, and consumer segments based on preferences and sociodemographic factors. To accomplish these objectives, a conjoint choice experiment was designed. Data were analyzed with the latent class approach. Initial results showed a 5-class model fit best. Results indicated that younger people tend to prefer Italian wines over domestic wines, whereas some older consumers strongly prefer domestic, lower priced wines. Other domestic wine consumers sought higher prices, possibly indicating a niche demand for high-quality Albanian wines. The wine industry and its marketers might use this information to strategically market their wine to different groups. Overall, the majority of the respondents preferred Italian wines, but many might be persuaded toward domestic wine. Government assistance in standardizing the quality of wine and introducing new grape cultivars and efficient farming practices should aid long-term competitiveness of domestic wine in Albania.