Social Interaction Effects in Disability Pension Participation: Evidence from Plant Downsizing*

We estimate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension participation among older workers in Norway. The problem of omitted variable bias is addressed using the exposure of an individual's neighbors to plant‐downsizing events as an instrument for the disability entry rate among the individual's previously employed neighbors. Our instrumental variable (IV) estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four‐year entry rate of older workers by about 0.4 percentage points. Numerous robustness and specification tests appear to support the validity of the identifying assumption in our IV strategy.     

Environmental Quality and Social Equality:

Abstract . The problems and contradictions which arise when an economically “poor” region is mandated to remain environmentally “pure“ are examined. The Adirondack region of New York State is such an area, being now protected by the 1972 Adirondack Park Land Use Plan. This limitation on development for environmental reasons has serious consequences for the 120,000 permanent residents within the park boundaries who, through their legislators, vigorously opposed the controls. A number of examples of the conflicts which have arisen are cited and a framework for “comprehensive” rather than “fragmented”planning is suggested.     

Consumer Choice and the Popular Music Industry: A Test of the Superstar Theory

The superstar model predicts skewness of market outcomes and returns to artist quality. We test and confirm these predictions using a unique data set on popular music.     

Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.     

Noise Trading and the Management of Operational Risk; Firms,Traders and Irrationality in Financial Markets*

abstract Efficient market models cannot explain the high level of trading in financial markets in terms of asset portfolio adjustment. It is presumed that much of this excessive trading is irrational ‘noise’ trading. A corollary is that there must either be irrational traders in the market or rational traders with irrational aberrations. The paper reviews the various attempts to explain noise trading in the finance literature, concluding that the persistence of irrationality is not well explained. Data from a study of 118 traders in four large investment banks are presented to advance reasons why traders might seek to trade more frequently than financial models predict. The argument is advanced that trades do not simply occur in order to generate profit, but it does not follow that such trading is irrational. Trading may generate information, accelerate learning, create commitments and enhance social capital, all of which sustain traders' long term survival in the market. The paper treats noise trading as a form of operational risk facing firms operating in financial markets and discusses approaches to the management of such risk.     

Methods for delivering complex social services: exploring adaptive management and regulation in the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme

In the wake of new public management, and with the emergence of new public governance, a number of challenges remain unsolved in the field of public service governance and management. In this paper, we use the example of the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme to show how we might deal with the design and implementation of a public service reform within the context of new public governance. We argue that governments need to develop greater openness to risk and policy experimentation during implementation. We therefore propose an adaptive system architecture that could support such risk taking.     

Strategic human resource management at Herman Miller

This article describes the Human Resource Management system in place at Herman Miller, Inc. (HMI). HMI's HR strategy is comprised of three primary goals: (1) building employee capabilities, (2) building employee commitment, and (3) improving the professional capabilities of the HR function itself. Key emphases of HMI's HR management infrastructure include (1) employee competency identification and development, (2) building employee participation, (3) building business literacy, (4) creating a “corporate community” through strong values and a sense of “belonging”, (5) community responsibility and environmental protection, (6) competently delivering the HR “fundamentals”, and (7) developing innovative partnerships with suppliers. Key challenges for the future include (1) change management, (2) clarifying HR's strategic role throughout the firm, and (3) attracting and retaining a diverse workforce. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Auditing in the Presence of Outside Sources of Information

We examine how an auditor's ability to terminate a multi-period client relationship provides the auditor with a real option whose value depends on the nature of informational asymmetry between the incumbent and other potential auditors. In particular, we isolate conditions under which the auditor's private and public sources of information behave as complements rather than substitutes. In such circumstances, increasing the likelihood of publicly provided information induces the auditor to expend more (rather than less)resources in private information gathering activities.