The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type

The paper extends the Holmström-Milgrom [B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303-328] analysis of intertemporal incentive provision to allow for the implementation of actions on the boundary of the feasible set. Boundary actions provide the principal with some freedom in choosing incentive schemes. This can be used to reduce premia. The paper characterizes optimal incentive schemes for the continuous-time Brownian-motion model and its discrete-time approximations. Linearity of incentive schemes in “accounts” is confirmed. However, for models with effort costs depending only on mean returns, the availability of boundary actions destroys the linearity of optimal incentive schemes in profits.     

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

The Interaction of Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank – A Methodological Reflection on Current Theories

The paper analyses the increasingly popular literature on strategic interactions from a methodological viewpoint. These political economy approaches focusing on interactions between wage bargaining institutions and an independent central bank do not follow unified methodological rules and so cannot be categorised under a single particular paradigm. Moreover, the literature remains in a way circumscribed by the limits of our logical capacities and of mathematical tractability and therefore relates to the 'real world' of wage bargaining and economic policy institutions in a very limited way only. A consideration of the vast complexity of institutional conditions that impact economic performance in EMU reminds and cautions one that actual economic policy research is able to cover only very few of the numerous conditions responsible for the overall outcome.     

The trade-off between innovation and defense industrial policy: A simulation model analysis of the Norwegian defense industry

The paper investigates the trade-off between innovation and defense industrial policy. It presents an agent-based simulation model calibrated for the Norwegian defense industry that compares different policy scenarios and examines the effects of a pending EU market liberalization process. The paper points to two main results. (1) It finds that a pure scenario where national authorities focus on, and provide support exclusively for, either a) international competitiveness or b) national defense and security objectives, is more Pareto efficient than a corresponding mixed strategy where policy makers simultaneously pursue both international competitiveness and defense and security objectives. (2) Under the conditions of the new EU liberalization regime, it finds that a stronger and more visible trade-off will emerge between international competitiveness and national defense and security objectives. Policy makers will have to choose which to prioritize, and set a clear agenda focusing on one of the two objectives.     

DISAGGREGATING FIRMS IN ANALYSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE UNIVERSITY–INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP: BASED ON AN ANALYTICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY FROM SCOTLAND

It has been acknowledged that universities are key institutions in national and regional systems of innovation. This recognition has led to a rich stream of literature analysing the university–industry relationship. However, relatively little attention has been devoted to disaggregating the ‘industry’ side of this relationship and examining the costs and benefits to the disaggregated parties involved. In the present article, which draws on an analytical and empirical study from Scotland, it is suggested that it makes sense to distinguish between three kinds of firms in analysing the university–industry relationship: large national and international R&D-intensive firms, university spin-out firms, and established small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that have had little interaction with universities. The different costs and benefits facing these firms in their interactions with universities are analysed. It is concluded that the established SMEs confront relatively high costs in relating to universities. Finally, the policy implications are explored.