Differential and More Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries and the International Trading System

This article argues that "differential and more favourable treatment"of developing countries in the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade (GATT) has been a logical consequence of their owninward-looking policies and the GATT's implicit mercantilism,the latter implying that liberalization, being costly, shouldnot be demanded of relatively poor countries. Time has, however,reduced both the appeal of the protectionist model of developmentand the willingness of developed countries to accord differentialtreatment. The upshot has been pressure on more advanced developingcountries to "graduate" and a growing literature recommendingfuller and more equal participation of developing countriesin the GATT. The case for fuller and more equal participationis not self-evident. It needs to be assessed on its merits interms of the prospects for improved market access abroad andmore efficient policy at home. The analysis indicates that thepotential benefits should not be oversold. On balance, however,the most advanced developing countries would probably gain fromactive and more equal participation in both GATT and the multilateraltrade negotiations while the remaining developing countrieswould benefit from graduation by the more advanced.     

Social Protection in a Crisis: Argentina's Plan Jefes y Jefas

The article assesses the impact of Argentina’s main socialpolicy response to the severe economic crisis of 2002. The programwas intended to provide direct income support for families withdependents and whose head had become unemployed because of thecrisis. Counterfactual comparisons are based on a matched subsetof applicants not yet receiving program assistance. Panel dataspanning the crisis are also used. The program reduced aggregateunemployment, though it attracted as many people into the workforcefrom inactivity as it did people who otherwise would have beenunemployed. Although there was substantial leakage to formallyineligible families and incomplete coverage of those who wereeligible, the program did partially compensate many losers fromthe crisis and reduced extreme poverty.     

The telecoms boom and bust 1996-2003 and the role of financial markets

Financial crises are still as much a part of the modern, information-and-communication-technology-based (ICT) economy as they were of previous economies. Why are we apparently unable to learn lessons from the past and avoid what Charles Kindleberger (2000) has called manias, panics and crashes? Why is it that our sophisticated stock of information, made readily and relatively cheaply available to us by our investment in ICTs, and our abundant theories and models, have not allowed us to steer clear of these financial excesses? The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the processes and mechanisms that have played a significant role in causing the Telecoms Boom and Bust, 1996-2003. The question of whether anything can be done about these processes and mechanisms in order to try and modify such financial excesses in the future is taken up in the conclusion.JEL Classification: A12, D8, E3, G1, L63, L96, N2, O30The author would like to acknowledge, without implicating, the helpful discussion with Richard Burns, Fred Bleakley and others who commented on an earlier version of this paper at Institutional Investors European Institute meeting in Berlin in March 2003, and with Stan Metcalfe on other occasions. In addition, thanks are due to many friends in NTT and InfoCom who assisted my learning about the Telecoms Industry and its dynamics.