Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests

Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This paper shows that if the competition between the managers can be characterized as a contest, owners may induce their managers to maximize sales. Moreover, there is a first‐mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive schemes. If delegation is endogenous the type of contest will determine whether all owners delegate their decisions to managers or not. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public–private partnerships in Social Impact Bonds: facilitating competition or hindering transparency?

ABSTRACT

The use of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), which introduces the potential for investor profit in public service provision, has been widely discussed. Some argue that SIBs might promote government transparency because outcome data collection and evaluation are part of contractual terms. On the other hand, some argue that SIBs might hinder government transparency because more contractual parties might lead to more uncertain data ownership and because the profit motive transforms information into a competitive advantage. This paper looks at SIBs in five countries, examining how transparency differed between SIB and non-SIB financed programmes at the same social service provider. On the positive side, SIBs led to more and longer collection of outcome data and the publication of evaluations. On the negative side, it was found that SIBs tend to generate significant obstacles to the release of data to academic researchers and that sponsored evaluations do not measure impacts.     

The role of headquarters in multinational profit shifting strategies

This paper stresses the special role of multinational headquarters in corporate profit shifting strategies. Using a large panel of European firms, we show that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are reluctant to shift profits away from their headquarters even if these are located in high-tax countries. Thus, shifting activities in response to corporate tax rate differentials between parents and subsidiaries are found to be significantly larger if the parent has a lower corporate tax rate than its subsidiary and profit is thus shifted towards the headquarter firm. This result is in line with recent empirical evidence which suggests that MNEs bias the location of profits and highly profitable assets in favor of the headquarter location.     

Social Learning in Beauty‐Contest Games

We study the impact of social learning on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty‐contest game. Naive advice and observation of others' decisions as two forms of social learning trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. We find that subjects who receive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others' past behavior before making their decision only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. A series of control‐treatments and simulations indicate that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.     

How much is the gap?—Efficient jump risk-adjusted valuation of leveraged certificates

This paper develops a novel and highly efficient numerical algorithm for the gap risk-adjusted valuation of leveraged certificates. The existing literature relies on Monte Carlo simulations, which are not fast enough to be used in a market-making environment. This is because issuers need to compute thousands of price updates per second. By valuing leveraged certificates as multi-window barrier options, we explicitly model random jumps that occur at known times, such as between the exchange closing and re-opening. Our algorithm combines the one-day transition probability with Simpson’s numerical integration rule. This yields a backward induction scheme which requires a significantly coarser spatial and time grid than finite-difference methods. We confirm its robustness and accuracy through Monte Carlo simulations.     

PRICE SETTING OF MARKET MAKERS: A FILTERING PROBLEM WITH ENDOGENOUS FILTRATION

This paper studies the price‐setting problem of market makers under risk neutrality and perfect competition in continuous time. The classic approach of Glosten–Milgrom is followed. Bid and ask prices are defined as conditional expectations of a true value of the asset given the market makers' partial information that includes the customers' trading decisions. The true value is modeled as a Markov process that can be observed by the customers with some noise at Poisson times. A mathematically rigorous analysis of the price‐setting problem is carried out, solving a filtering problem with endogenous filtration that depends on the bid and ask price processes quoted by the market maker. The existence and uniqueness of the bid and ask price processes is shown under some conditions.     

To push performance,check the leader’s power motive

The power motive, defined as the desire to impact the behavior and emotions of another person, has long been controversial. On one side, the exercise of power has been put forth as a fundamental human need greater in strength than the need to survive. On the other, it has been vilified for its potentially devastating consequences. We argue the latter view is distorted, and, by relying too heavily on it, we have come to misunderstand the essential nature of power and its use by leaders charged with driving performance. It is not the power motive that leads to corruption and tyranny, but rather how the power motive is channeled into behavior by other personality factors. Consequently, those charged with leader selection should place greater emphasis on how individuals with strong power motives differ in how they channel power. Doing so will support the selection of executives best equipped to deliver organizational performance.