Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations

Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This article studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like payments in stock options or uncertain arbitration procedures. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payments to third parties. In addition, stochastic contracts can be more efficient and can make the principal better off compared to deterministic contracts. My results also address the puzzle about the prevalence of labor contracts with stochastic compensation.     

The legitimacy of corporate entrepreneurship: a structured literature review

Management Review Quarterly - Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is essential for today’s firms and currently a topic of considerable interest within the business community. Although the...     

What makes migrants more entrepreneurial? Investigating the role of cultural distance and human capital

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - Migrant entrepreneurship is seen as an important way to foster economic prosperity as migrants often come with greater entrepreneurial...