Human capital investments in asymmetric corporate tournaments

We consider a tournament between two workers of different abilities who choose both human capital investment and effort. The employer can influence the workers’ behavior by determining the sequence of human capital investments, i.e. the training design. The workers can either invest simultaneously or sequentially with the favorite being the first mover or sequentially with the underdog as first mover. The results show that the outcome of the tournament crucially depends on the employer’s choice of training design and on the ability difference between the workers. If the two workers clearly differ in their abilities the employer will prefer simultaneous human capital accumulation. However, if the abilities of the two workers are rather similar the employer optimally chooses sequential human capital accumulation with the underdog being the first mover.     

Zur Lage der Kommunikationswissenschaft und ihrer Fachgesellschaft. Ergebnisse der DGPuK-Mitgliederbefragung 2003

Like other broad disciplines in the media/communications field, communication science is characterized by rapid growth and increasing diversity and hence confusion. That also affects the discipline’s scholarly associations. So the German Association for Communication Science (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Publizistik- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, DGPuK), the largest German-speaking association in this field, conducted a survey among its members in early 2003. This article reports on the design and findings of this study, focusing on the perception and evaluation of the association and on the scholarly orientations (theoretic perspectives and methodologies) of its members. Various subgroups within the DGPuK diverge in their positions and opinions. This applies in particular to the less well represented research traditions and subdisciplines (as compared to the social-scientific mainstream), which tend to view the DGPuK as one-sided. Deviations also show for professionals working outside the academic field (as compared to DGPuK members from universities) and in part for older members and women. The findings not only give an up-to-date picture of the state of the DGPuK but also shed light on the situation and development of the discipline as a whole.     

On the Benefits of Withholding Knowledge in Organizations

Transferring knowledge to an agent makes him more successful or productive, which is beneficial for the principal. However, knowledge transfer also increases the agent’s outside option. I identify two reasons for withholding knowledge — to reduce labor costs within a principal–agent relationship, and to weaken the agent in case of a separation. Moreover, the role of synergy is discussed both for building up a principal–agent relationship and for transferring knowledge. While synergy is decisive for knowledge transfer, cooperation between the principal and agent may even take place in the absence of synergy. Furthermore, I analyze whether the principal is more likely to transfer knowledge to a more able or to a less able agent. Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of a noncompetition clause are briefly discussed.     

Statistical study of foreign exchange rates, empirical evidence of a price change scaling law, and intraday analysis

In this paper we present a statistical analysis of four foreign exchange spot rates against the U.S. Dollar with several million intra-day prices over 3 years. The analysis also includes gold prices and samples of daily foreign exchange prices over 15 years. The mean absolute changes of logarithmic prices are found to follow a scaling law against the time interval on which they are measured. This empirical law holds although the distributions of the price changes strongly differ for different interval sizes.Systematic variations of the volatility are found even during business hours by an intra-day analysis of price changes. Seasonal heteroskedasticity is observed with a period of one day as well as one week as the result of an analogous intra-week analysis; taking this into account is necessary for any future study of intra-day price change distributions and their generating process. The same type of analysis is also made for the bid-ask spreads.     

R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests

Considering oligopolistic contests with R&D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business cycle measurement with some theory

A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specification of the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use some to identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. The approach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. The method is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers) in a standard class of models.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.