THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF NITROGEN LIMITATION POLICIES

The effects of nitrogen limitation policies on the UK fertiliser market are considered. Using a simulation model which incorporates some structural aspects of the UK fertiliser industry, the extent and distribution of the welfare effects of nitrogen tax and quota policies are estimated. The results show that, while farmers lose from both policies, the main fertiliser manufacturers may gain in the short run from a quota policy, while profits would be reduced with a nitrogen tax policy.     

Using “Rapid Response” as a competitive tool

New technology allows companies to respond quickly to customer demands that differ from country to country. In the international arena, time and flexibility are competitive weapons.     

Counter-intuitive results in game theory

General comparative game statics results are derived in order to provide testable hypotheses in game-like situations. These results run counter to ordinary economic intuition. It becomes necessary to initially define whether a situation represents perfect competition or monopoly on the one hand or a game-like situation on the other hand because these different assumptions lead to greatly differing results. Several empirical applications of the theory are suggested.     

Learning and fatigue during choice experiments: a comparison of online and mail survey modes

This study investigates the effect of survey mode on respondent learning and fatigue during repeated choice experiments. Stated preference data are obtained from an experiment concerning high‐speed Internet service conducted on samples of mail respondents and online respondents. We identify and estimate aspects of the error components for different subsets of the choice questions, for both mail and online respondents. Results show mail respondents answer questions consistently throughout a series of choice experiments, but the quality of the online respondents' answers declines. Therefore, while the online survey provides lower survey administration costs and reduced time between implementation and data analysis, such benefits come at the cost of less precise responses. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetric effect of basis on dynamic futures hedging: Empirical evidence from commodity markets

The dynamic minimum variance hedge ratios (MVHRs) have been commonly estimated using the Bivariate GARCH model that overlooks the basis effect on the time-varying variance–covariance of spot and futures returns. This paper proposes an alternative specification of the BGARCH model in which the effect is incorporated for estimating MVHRs. Empirical investigation in commodity markets suggests that the basis effect is asymmetric, i.e., the positive basis has greater impact than the negative basis on the variance and covariance structure. Both in-sample and out-of-sample comparisons of the MVHR performance reveal that the model with the asymmetric effect provides greater risk reduction than the conventional models, illustrating importance of the asymmetric effect when modeling the joint dynamics of spot and futures returns and hence estimating hedging strategies.     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

Customer reactions to variety: Too much of a good thing?

Summary Studying product variety is an interesting and relevant area for research. Work in this area should build on careful understanding of both customers’ reactions to it and managers’ decision making with respect to it. This requires an interdisciplinary focus, drawing on work in information processing, channels, operations management, game theory, and managerial decision making. In fact, the major advances may come more from combining knowledge from the different areas rather than boring more deeply into a single one. Donald R. Lehmann is George E. Warren Professor of Business at the Columbia University Graduate School of Business. He has a B.S. degree in mathematics from Union College, Schenectady, New York, and an M.S.I.A. and Ph.D. from the Krannert School of Purdue University. His research interests include modeling individual choice and decision making, understanding group and interdependent decisions, meta-analysis, and the introduction and adoption of innovations. He has taught courses in marketing, management, and statistics. He has published in and served on the editorial boards ofJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Management Science, andMarketing Science, and is founding editor ofMarketing Letters. In addition to numerous journal articles, he has published four books:Market Research and Analysis, Analysis for Marketing Planning, Product Management, andMeta Analysis in Marketing. Professor Lehmann served as executive director of the Marketing Science Institute from 1993 to 1995 and as president of the Association for Consumer Research in 1995.