Auctions with costly information acquisition

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where bidders must incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for each period, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyers should be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms must induce the bidders to acquire information about their valuations and to reveal this information truthfully. Using a generalized Groves principle, we prove a very general “full extraction of the surplus” result: the seller can obtain the same profit as if he had full control over the bidders’ acquisition of information and could have observed directly their valuations once they are informed. We also present appealing implementations of the optimal mechanism in special cases. For helpful comments we thank George Deltas, David Martimort, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants in Mannheim, Rutgers, Tel Aviv, Toulouse, the Society for Economic Design 2002 conference in New York, and the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Evanston, IL. Yossi Spiegel thanks the IIBR for financial assistance and Charles Zheng thanks the NSF for grant SES-0214471.     

Bonding and Bridging Associational Social Capital and the Financial Performance of Local Authorities in Israel

Abstract

This study explores whether bridging and bonding social capital differ in their impacts on government performance at the local level and the extent to which these impacts vary between localities exhibiting differing socioeconomic resources. The study is based on an analysis of 256 local authorities in Israel. The findings show that bridging and bonding social capital do differ in their respective effects on government performance and that the nature of the relationship of each type of capital with government performance varies by the community's socioeconomic profile. Poor communities with high densities of bridging social capital were characterized by lower deficits as a percentage of total municipal budgets, more accurate expenditure forecasts and greater spending on services per capita.     

The optimal supply of congested public goods for homogeneous and heterogeneous customers

Impure public goods resulting from the congestion effect are discussed in the literature solely for the case of homogenous populations where consumers have identical demands. We extend this to include heterogeneous populations, where demands are rectangularly distributed. We compare the optimal values of the control variables (quantity of the public good and the number of users) for both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations, as well as the social optimum values for both cases. We distinguish between two kinds of congestion effects: (1) increased usage which negatively affects the individual consumer's utility, and (2) the affect is located on the supply side, i.e. higher production costs due to an increased number of users.     

The Welfare of Nations in a Globalized Economy

Is free trade always good for advanced industrialized countries? Are fears of globalization and outsourcing imaginary, totally unfounded, and misguided? Is the West always going to benefit from technological improvements in the East? This article constructs a few thought experiments to analyze such issues. The article provides some rational insight into the puzzle of why global trade is so controversial. The effects of technological improvements in the East on the welfare of both the East and the West are analyzed. The conclusion highlights some of the less desirable effects of outsourcing in a more globalized world.     

Price Discrimination with One-way Separated Markets

This paper extends the traditional model of third degree price discrimination which assumes complete separation between markets to the case where markets are only one-way separated. In two periods of time one can carry over quantities of the product from the present to the future but not vice versa. We show that this model provides a wide framework for analysis of several promotional marketing strategies.     

How Do Risk Attitudes Differ within the Group of Entrepreneurs? The Role of Motivation and Procedural Utility

Starting a business involves risk and, thus, requires a risk‐taking attitude. The concept of risk and entrepreneurship has been widely discussed in the entrepreneurship literature; most studies compare entrepreneurs with nonentrepreneurs such as managers or bankers. So far, little research exists on the risk attitudes of the different types of entrepreneurs—those who pursue a new business because of opportunity and those who do so through necessity. This study aims to fill this gap. Our particular focus is on individuals' motivations to start their businesses and the nonmonetary returns from entrepreneurship. The results show that opportunity entrepreneurs are more willing to take risks than necessity entrepreneurs. In addition, those who are motivated by creativity are more risk tolerant than other entrepreneurs. The study contributes to the literature about both risk attitudes of entrepreneurs and necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship.     

The Effects of Criminal Experience on the Incidence of Crime

A bstract . A hypothesis has been analyzed that criminals learn by doing, that with experience criminals increase their activity so that with level outlays on police the incidence of crime may be increasing. This hypothesis is tested by statistical analysis of time series cross sectional data on crime levels, police outlays and various socioeconomic variables. The results confirm that "learning by doing"—accumulating criminal experience—increases criminal activity, that police outlays have a negative and significant effect on crime and that certain socioeconomic characteristics have a significant effect on crime.     

Commercial software,adware, and consumer privacy

I study the choice between selling new software commercially and bundling it with ads and distributing it for free as adware. Adware allows advertisers to send targeted information to consumers which improves their purchasing decisions, but also entails a loss of privacy. I show that adware is more profitable when the perceived quality of the software is relatively low, when tracking technology improves, when consumers benefit more from information on consumer products and are less likely to receive it from external sources. I also show that improvements in the technology of display ads will lead to less violation of privacy and will benefit consumers, that depending on the software's quality, there are either too many or too few display ads in equilibrium, and that from a social perspective, adware dominates commercial software.     

Stock price volatility in a multiple security overlapping generations model

A number of empirical studies have reached the conclusion thatstock price volatility cannot be fully explained within thestandard dividend discount model. This article proposes a resolutionbased upon a model that contains both a random supply of riskyassets and finitely lived agents who trade in a multiple securityenvironment. As the analysis shows there exist 2^K equilibriawhen K securities trade. The low volatility equilibria haveproperties analogous to those found in the infinitely livedagent models of Campbell and Kyle (1991) and Wang (1993, 1994).In contrast, the high-volatility equilibria have very differentcharacteristics. Within the high-volatility equilibria verylarge price variances can be generated with very small supplyshocks. Adding securities to the economy further reduces therequired supply shocks. Using previously established empiricalresults the model can reconcile the data with supply shocksthat are less than 10% as large as observed return shocks. Theseresults are shown to hold even when the dividend process ismean reverting.     

A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design

We develop a theory of organization design in which the firm's structure is chosen by trading off ex post efficiency in the implementation of projects against ex ante efficiency in the selection of projects. Using our framework, we derive a novel set of empirical predictions regarding differences between firms with a functional structure and firms with a divisional structure. We examine how the overall profitability of the two structures is affected by various factors like size, complexity, and asymmetry in the importance of tasks and also explore the desirability of adopting a narrow business strategy.