SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS FOR NEW INVESTMENT AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF INSIDER TRADES

Significant negative valuation effects are widely acknowledged for firms announcing seasoned equity offerings. This result is consistent with theoretical models linking new equity issues to increased adverse-selection costs, lower management ownership in the firm, misuse of free cash flow, or expectations for earnings declines. Also increasingly evident, insiders trade around corporate announcements. We test the hypothesis that insider trading and announcements of new equity issues serve as joint signals in the market's evaluation of prospective capital investment projects. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that insider trading is related to market reaction to announcements of new equity issues.     

THE INTRADAY INTERDEPENDENCE STRUCTURE BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPANESE EQUITY MARKETS

Contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, previous research documents a significant correlation between lagged U.S. close-to-close stock market returns and current open-to-close Japanese equity market returns. We find that the significant correlation is limited to the first hour of Japanese trading, with subsequent hourly returns independent of lagged U.S. returns. This evidence suggests that the documented significant correlation is attributable to a sticky Japanese opening value associated with the use of nonsynchronous index data.     

Takeover Prediction and Portfolio Performance: A Note

This paper empirically tests whether it is possible to generate abnormal returns from investing in a portfolio of predicted successful takeover targets. Portfolios are formed on the basis of predictions from models similar to those estimated by Palepu (1986). However, unlike Palepu (1986), the portfolios in this paper are formed using a decision rule that results in smaller portfolios with higher average takeover probabilities. This provides a stronger test of whether share prices reflect future takeover probabilities. The results show that while the models have significant explanatory power, the portfolios fail to beat the return on the market over a 12-month holding-period.     

WITHDRAWN SPIN‐OFFS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We examine market reaction to corporate spin‐offs that are eventually withdrawn. These spin‐offs do not experience the significant positive share price response reported for spin‐offs generally. The overall market reaction to both the initial spin‐off announcement and the withdrawal announcement is not significant. When a reason is provided for withdrawing a spin‐off, there is a significant positive market reaction; otherwise, there is a significant negative reaction. Firms that withdraw a spin‐off without stating a reason experience significant deterioration in industry‐adjusted operating performance in the three years following the withdrawal. These results indicate the market can anticipate the viability of withdrawn spin‐offs at the time of the initial announcement. JEL classification: G34