The Effect of Demographics on Job Satisfaction: A Study of Hotel Managers in Turkey

This study examined the relationship between selected demographic characteristics of middle-level hotel managers in Turkey and five selected job satisfaction dimensions (degree of satisfaction with the work, coworkers, supervision, financial compensation, and promotion opportunities). In addition, the relationship between job satisfaction dimensions and the middle-level hotel managers' overall job satisfaction level was analyzed. The study sample consists of 103 middle-level hotel managers (all Turkish nationals) in 17 rated four- and five-star hotels in Kusadasi, Turkey. Study findings indicate significant differences between managers in various demographic categories and their levels of job satisfaction. Overall, the data revealed that financial compensation, promotion opportunities, and supervision most significantly impacted middle-level hotel managers' overall job satisfaction levels.     

Bayesian analysis of the two‐part model with endogeneity: application to health care expenditure

This paper studies the effect of managed care on medical expenditure using a model in which the insurance status is assumed to be endogenous. Insurance plan choice is modeled through the multinomial probit model. The medical expenditure variable, the outcome of interest, has a significant proportion of zeros that are handled using the two‐part model, extended to handle endogenous insurance. The estimation approach is Bayesian, based on the Gibbs Sampler. The model is applied to a sample of 20 460 individuals obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. The results provide substantial evidence of selectivity. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Did the rising importance of services decelerate overall productivity improvement of Turkey during 2002–2007?

This paper answers the question of what would have been the growth rate of aggregate productivity in Turkey between 2002 and 2007, had it realized China’s rates of productivity growth in agriculture, industry, and services. It does this in a three-sector general equilibrium model calibrated to the Turkish economy over the 2002–2007 period. The main findings are: (i) Turkey would have had much higher aggregate productivity growth over this period if it had experienced China’s service sector productivity growth; (ii) very low productivity growth rates in finance and in the non-market service sector are the main culprits behind Turkey’s weak service-sector performance.     

On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. A point $x$ of the polytope is called single-best if there is a point $y$ of the polytope such that $x$ is the unique point of the polytope at maximal distance from $y$ . It is proved that if the polytope does not have either exactly two single-best points or exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, then any Pareto optimal and strategy-proof rule is dictatorial. If the polytope has exactly two single-best points, then there are non-dictatorial strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rules, which can be described by committee voting (simple games) between the two single-best points. This also holds if there are exactly four single-best points which form the vertices of a rectangle, but in that case, we limit ourselves to describing an example of such a rule. The framework under consideration models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region.     

What Determines Public Support for Affirmative Action?

We present a public higher-education finance model in which demand for education can exceed supply because of indivisibilities in educational investment. In such situations, a screening mechanism—which may exhibit a selection system bias—is required for allocation. We show how changes in the education premium and the test score gap between the minority and the majority might affect political support for affirmative action. When the education premium is relatively low, the matching efficiency gains provided by affirmative action are high compared with the opportunity cost of not acquiring education, and the majority supports affirmative action. When the education premium is high, the opportunity cost of not getting educated is high relative to the matching efficiency gains provided by affirmative action policies, and the majority's support for affirmative action is weaker. In contrast, a higher test score bias has a generally ambigious effect on the majority's political support. If the test score bias is sufficiently large, however, the majority does support affirmative action.     

A model of entry–exit decisions and capacity choice under demand uncertainty

Many investment decisions of agribusiness firms, such as when to invest in an emerging market or whether to expand the capacity of the firm, involve irreversible investment and uncertainty about demand, cost or competition. This paper uses an option‐value model to examine the factors affecting an agribusiness firm's decision whether and how much to invest in an emerging market under demand uncertainty. Demand uncertainty and irreversibility of investment make investment less desirable than the net present value (NPV) rule indicates. The inactive firm is more reluctant to enter the market when it takes into account demand uncertainty because it preserves the opportunity of making a better investment later. The active firm is more reluctant to abandon the investment because there is an option value of keeping the operation alive. There is a greater distance between the entry and exit thresholds under the option‐value approach than under the NPV rule due to demand uncertainty. The results have implications for agribusiness decision‐making.     

Ranking Committees,Income Streams or Multisets

Multisets are collections of objects which may include several copies of the same object. They may represent bundles of goods, committees formed of members of several political parties, or income streams. In this paper we investigate the ways in which a linear order on a finite set A can be consistently extended to an order on the set of all multisets on A of some given cardinality k and when such an extension arises from a utility function on A. The condition of consistency that we introduce is a close relative of the de Finetti’s condition that defines comparative probability orders. We prove that, when A has three elements, any consistent linear order on multisets on A of cardinality k arises from a utility function and all such orders can be characterised by means of Farey fractions. This is not true when A has cardinality four or greater. It is proved that, unlike linear orders that can be represented by a utility function, any non-representable order on the set of all multisets of cardinality k cannot be extended to a consistent linear order on multisets of cardinality K for sufficiently large K. We also discuss the concept of risk aversion arising in this context.A significant part of this work was written when both authors were visiting professors at Bilkent University, Ankara. Slinko thanks Semih Koray and Mefharet Kocatepe for making this possible and Serguei Stepanov for discussion about Farey fractions. Sertel thanks the Institut des Hautes Etudes Scientifiques (IHES), Bures-sur-Yvette, France, for a couple of invitations, in 1999 and 2000, during which he had a chance to elaborate on some of the questions addressed in this paper. The authors thank students of The University of Auckland Irene Peng and Mark Lui who participated at an early stage of this project and Marston Conder for checking the result of Theorem 6 with MAGMA and correcting it. Murat Sertel was deceased (1942 – 2003).An erratum to this article is available at .