Managing Dispersed Knowledge: Organizational Problems,Managerial Strategies,and Their Effectiveness

While there has been much progress in understanding organizational knowledge and knowledge management practices, some questions still remain unresolved. This paper argues that at least one important driver of knowledge‐related organizational problems has been rather neglected so far: that is, the dispersed nature of organizational knowledge. The paper analyses the organizational problems and managerial responses arising from dispersed knowledge. It identifies three drivers by which the dispersedness of knowledge leads to management problems: namely, it creates large numbers, asymmetries, and uncertainty. A number of managerial strategies for dealing with the different components of the problems created by the dispersedness of knowledge are identified and their effectiveness analysed, thereby informing managers as to how best to deal with dispersed knowledge. The analysis of uncertainty‐related implications of dispersed knowledge uncovers an overlooked distinction that is helpful for understanding dispersed knowledge and its managerial implications. This is the distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity, i.e. a strong form of uncertainty that cannot be remedied by the standard strategy of increasing the information available.     

THE INTRADAY INTERDEPENDENCE STRUCTURE BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPANESE EQUITY MARKETS

Contrary to the efficient market hypothesis, previous research documents a significant correlation between lagged U.S. close-to-close stock market returns and current open-to-close Japanese equity market returns. We find that the significant correlation is limited to the first hour of Japanese trading, with subsequent hourly returns independent of lagged U.S. returns. This evidence suggests that the documented significant correlation is attributable to a sticky Japanese opening value associated with the use of nonsynchronous index data.     

The derived demand for faculty research

Estimation of the demands for many services supplied by government and charitable organizations are hampered by two practices common to the supply of these services. The suppliers often employ non‐price rationing of these services, and they price discriminate. The supply of college training, for example, is rationed on the basis of academic ability as well as willingness to pay, and more able students are typically quoted lower net prices (associated with scholarships) than less able students. This paper suggests a method for dealing with both practices in the analysis of cross‐sectional data. This methodology is used to investigate the question of why university faculty members are expected to do research as well as teach. One answer supported by our empirical work is that the customers (e.g., the students) demand it. Thus, controlling for price and non‐academic features, better students will choose to attend a university where more scholarly research is performed. Moreover, our empirical findings also support a strong negative link between faculty time devoted to teaching and the supply of research. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"A players" or "A positions"? The strategic logic of workforce management

Companies simply can't afford to have "A players" in all positions. Rather, businesses need to adopt a portfolio approach to workforce management, systematically identifying their strategically important A positions, supporting B positions, and surplus C positions, then focusing disproportionate resources on making sure A players hold A positions. This is not as obvious as it may seem, because the three types of positions do not reflect corporate hierarchy, pay scales, or the level of difficulty in filling them. A positions are those that directly further company strategy and, less obviously, exhibit wide variation in the quality of the work done by the people who occupy them. Why variability? Because raising the average performance of individuals in these critical roles will pay huge dividends in corporate value. If a company like Nordstrom, for example, whose strategy depends on personalized service, were to improve the performance of its frontline sales associates, it could reap huge revenue benefits. B positions are those that support A positions or maintain company value. Inattention to them could represent a significant downside risk. (Think how damaging it would be to an airline, for example, if the quality of its pilots were to drop.) Yet investing in them to the same degree as A positions is ill-advised because B positions don't offer an upside potential. (Pilots are already highly trained, so channeling resources into improving their performance would probably not create much competitive advantage.) And C positions? Companies should consider outsourcing them--or eliminating them. We all know that effective business strategy requires differentiating a firm's products and services in ways that create value for customers. Accomplishing this requires a differentiated workforce strategy, as well.     

Modeling and measuring intraday overreaction of stock prices

We introduce a model for stock prices consisting of a fundamental price process and a news impact curve, which allows for either overreaction, underreaction, or correct response to changes of the fundamental value. We further develop statistics based on OHLC data, which separately measure upside and downside overreaction. The distribution of these statistics under the hypothesis of correct response and fundamental prices following Brownian motions is used to derive tests for upside and downside overreaction. We show that more realistic and frequently used fundamental price processes with correct response leave the distribution of the test statistics widely unaffected or lead to conservative tests. Empirical application to different stock markets provides strong evidence for intraday overreaction, particularly to bad news. The economic significance of the discrimination induced by the proposed statistics is further illustrated by analyzing the performance of a simple buy on bad news strategy.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

Mind the Gap: Crowdfunding and the Role of Seed Money

We analyze voluntary private contributions to public goods and the role seed money plays in signaling the public good's quality to potential subsequent contributors. We present a theoretical model and analyze two sets of naturally occurring data from crowdfunding platforms. After developing the theoretical background, we find statistically significant switch points that distinguish between seed contributions and subsequent contributions. A positive change in contribution behavior after the switch suggests an increase in the perceived value of the public good. We find that the signal comprises the number of contributors and the average contribution (as a proportion of the targeted goal). Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm dynamics, markup variations, and the business cycle

We present a model in which net business formation is endogenously procyclical. Variations in the number of operating firms lead to countercyclical variations in markups that give rise to endogenous procyclical movements in measured total factor productivity (TFP). Based on this result, the paper suggests a simple structural decomposition of variations in TFP into those originating from exogenous shocks and those originating endogenously from the interaction between firms’ entry and exit decisions and the degree of competition. The decomposition suggests that around 40% of the movements in measured TFP can be attributed to this interaction. Moreover, the paper analyzes the effects on (i) the measurement of the volatility of exogenous shocks in the U.S. economy and (ii) the magnification of shocks over the business cycle.     

Fiscal equalisation schemes under competition

This paper considers optimal fiscal equalisation in a federation that competes with other federations for business tax base. It formalises the argument that, under certain circumstances, federations have an incentive to foster tax competition among their subunits in order to attract tax base from other federations. We show that optimal fiscal equalisation serves the purpose of redistributing income from rich to poor subunits and of choosing an optimal level of tax competition. The latter is chosen as a trade-off between three goals. First, decentralised tax rate setting has positive fiscal externalities within the federation and, thus, tax rates are inefficiently low. Second, in the presence of hold-up problems in investment, tax rates may be inefficiently high. Then, tax competition serves as a commitment device for low future tax rates and is, thus, welfare enhancing. Third, generous fiscal equalisation within the federation is a commitment to not aggressively compete with subunits outside the federation for tax base; as a consequence, with optimal equalisation, equilibrium tax rates are higher within and outside the federation—and even higher than in the case of centralised (i.e. federal level) tax rate setting.