Interest rate expectations and uncertainty during ECB Governing Council days: Evidence from intraday implied densities of 3-month EURIBOR

This paper analyses changes in short-term interest rate expectations and uncertainty during ECB Governing Council days. For this purpose, it extends the estimation of risk-neutral probability density functions up to tick frequency. In particular, the non-parametric estimator of these densities, which is based on fitting implied volatility curves, is applied to estimate intraday expectations of 3-month EURIBOR 3 months ahead. Estimates of the noise impact on the statistical moments of the densities enhance the interpretation. In addition, the paper assesses the impact of the ECB communication during Governing Council days. The results show that the whole density may react to the communication and that such repositioning of market participants’ expectations will contain information beyond that of changes in the consensus view already observed in forward rates. The results also point out the relevance of the press conference in providing extra information and triggering an adjustment process for interest rate expectations.     

Curvature and the elasticity of substitution: Straightening it out

This paper demonstrates that, contrary to deeply rooted beliefs, there is no link between curvature and the elasticity of substitution. We show that there is no direct, nor inverse, relationship between the two concepts, if curvature of the isoquant is defined either in its strict mathematical sense or as the isoquant's second derivative. We finally suggest to view the elasticity of substitution as an efficiency parameter.     

Rationalizable implementation

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive, i.e. in distinct states it selects distinct outcomes, we show that strict Maskin monotonicity is also sufficient under a mild “no worst alternative” condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive.