Interests Versus Ideology in the Ratification of the 16th and 17th Amendments

The ideology of Progressivism that peaked in the early years of the 20th century brought with it the 16th amendment, which allowed the federal government to tax incomes, and the 17th amendment, which mandated direct elections of Senators. Both were ratified in 1913. The 16th amendment provided the financing for government to expand its scope, and the 17th amendment created more democratic accountability, which both were goals of the Progressive movement. An examination of House and Senate voting on these amendments suggests that those opposed to the amendments voted against them based on interests rather than ideology.     

The behavioral perspective model of purchase and consumption: From consumer theory to marketing practice

The Behavioral Perspective Model of purchase and consumption (BPM) portrays the rate at which consumer behaviors take place as a function of the relative openness of the setting in which they occur and the informational and hedonic reinforcement available in or promised by the setting. Each of eight combinations of contingencies based on these explanatory variables is uniquely related to a specific mode of observed consumer behavior. By providing an environmental perspective on consumer behavior, the model makes a critical contribution to the development of contemporary consumer research that frequently decontextualizes its subject matter. It also presents an innovative conceptualization of the nature of marketing strategies.     

How I reversed an unfair UR denial

When an insurer wouldn't pay for a drug his patient needed, the author let loose a barrage of letters. See what made them work.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.