Networks in family business: a multi-rational approach

Current research on networks in family businesses has approached the topic from a mono-rational perspective where the family, business and social networks are each considered in relative isolation. This paper argues that multi-rational approaches, which accept that the three groups of networks interact and overlap, offer a useful alternative perspective. In proposing the case for multiple rationalities as a framework within which family business networking can be viewed – and in putting forward an initial model – the paper allows the interaction of the different networks within the family business to be more fully acknowledged. Evidence from the literature is presented as a basis for further exploration using empirical approaches and it is emphasised that further and empirical approaches are required.     

Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer programs: The case of ethanol

This paper reconsiders the analogy between competitive markets and the political process that is central to much of the literature on the efficiency of government transfers. The key problem is that property rights in politics are much less well defined than they are in competitive markets. As the paper outlines, obtaining accurate information about the benefits and costs of transfers is likely to be much more difficult than envisioned in the literature. Investigators, as well as general voters, often must rely on the government and competing parties for provision of information about underlying program parameters and functional relationships. We argue that politicians and the affected interest groups have incentives to limit and distort the information that is released to voters and that political competition is unlikely to be an effective counter. In developing the argument, a theoretical framework is provided and applied in a case study of the ethanol transfer. The documented efforts to disguise the actual costs and benefits of the program are important for gaining a broader understanding of the functioning and costs of government transfers in the economy.     

Comparing group and individual decision-making in risky environments

This dissertation completes salient group and individual experiments in two environments that differ as to whether or not an evaluative criterion exists to judge subject performance. The first environment is lottery-choice. No such criterion exists in a lottery-choice environment. Subjects base their decisions on their preference for risk. A lottery-choice experiment consists of a menu of paired lottery choices structured so that the crossover point to the high-risk lottery can be used to infer the degree of risk aversion. The results show a significant interaction exists between subject composition and lottery winning-percentage. Groups are more likely than individuals to choose the “safe” lottery in the lowest winning-percentages, but less likely to choose the “safe” lottery in the highest winning-percentages. This effect is also present in the sequenced experiment. Further, the sequenced experiment shows that group discussion results in a significant increase in the group’s risk aversion from the average risk preference of its members. Finally, the sequenced experiment shows making a decision in the group phase has an immediate impact on subsequent individual decisions compared to the subject’s initial decisions. The second environment is resource allocation. A resource allocation experiment consists of subjects making repeated decisions of how to divide an endowment into two assets, one of which the payoff is unknown. An evaluative criterion to the resource allocation problem exists, as there is a specific allocation that maximizes payoffs. However, subjects must learn the solution through search. Experimental results show: 1) group performance in the resource allocation experiment is not significantly different than individuals; 2) the predictions from a local search model are more consistent with group decisions than the predictions from a global search model; and 3) group risk preferences elicited through a separate lottery-choice experiment are not indicative of their performance in the resource allocation experiment. Ph.D. Dissertation, Completed at Indiana University, Bloomington Dissertation Committee: Chair–Professor Arlington W. Williams, Indiana University, Bloomington Assistant Professor Hugh Kelley, Indiana University, Bloomington Associate Professor Susan K. Laury, Georgia State University Professor James M. Walker, Indiana University, Bloomington     

Time,space and competition. Formulations for the development of marketing strategy

Marketing strategy has been based on principles of general equilibrium which has not served decision-makers well. The present discussion argues that are more dynamic and unique elements which must be considered in the development of strategy. The thesis is that competition should be examined in temporal and spatial elements, both of which are highly subjective. It goes on to link these concepts with the entrepreneurial perspective that the environment is a variable which can be shaped. This reinforces a central theme, namely, management's need to recognize and exploit the vast heterogeneity found in markets. Unlike much present theory, the present argument stresses the importance of heterogeneity.     

Transparency for governance: The mechanisms and effectiveness of disclosure-based and education-based transparency policies

When transparency is used as a tool for global environmental governance - i.e., to induce targeted actors to reduce environmentally-harmful behaviors, it can operate via disclosure or education. Disclosure-based policies improve the information the public has about targeted actors' behaviors while education-based policies improve the information targeted actors have about their own behaviors, whether that is information about consequences, alternatives, or social norms. Various social and political forces shape whether and what type of transparency policies are adopted. Disclosure-based and education-based transparency policies are effective under different conditions and operate through different mechanisms. Both often operate through mechanisms that reflect an instrumental logic of consequences but also can and do operate through mechanisms that reflect a normative logic of appropriateness, by increasing the legitimacy accorded to global environmental norms and the social accountability targeted actors feel regarding their behaviors. Understanding the differences in the mechanisms by which disclosure-based and education-based transparency policies operate suggests that both scholars and practitioners should use caution in understanding why, and predicting when, such policies will work.