Predicting the budgetary funding need of education in the three-year budget for 2008–2010

The paper presents a technique developed by the authors, which makes it possible to determine the necessary amount of financing for education at all the budget system levels for 2008-2010, based on the Russian average value of financing, taking into account the budget expenditures index for two variants of student population, i.e. the actual number of on-budget students and the number of students required to meet the economy’s need for trained workers. The technique was developed and the calculations were made on the basis of Russian long-term forecasts and the Russian three-year federal budget for 2008–2010.     

Financial Development and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence from Six MENA Countries

This paper examines the causal relationship between financial development and economic growth for six Middle Eastern and North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia), within a quadvariate vector autoregressive framework. We employ four different measures of financial development and apply the augmented vector autoregression vector (VAR) methodology of Toda and Yamamoto to test for Granger causality. Our empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that finance leads to growth in five out of the six countries. Only in Israel could weak support be found for causality running from economic growth to financial development but no causality in the other direction. These findings suggest the need to accelerate the financial reforms that have been launched since the mid 1980s and to improve the efficiency of these countries’ financial systems to stimulate saving/investment and, consequently, long‐term economic growth.     

Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States

Zusammenfassung Koordinierte Strategien für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten. - In diesem Aufsatz wird die dynamische Spieltheorie auf die Koordinierung der Politik zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der EWG in einem stark aggregierten Modell angewandt und folgendes gezeigt: (i) Eine Politik, die den Einflu\ von Ma\nahmen anderer L?nder vernachl?ssigt, führt in den USA zu Fiskalischen Einschr?nkungen und einer Verminderung der staatlichen Interventionen, in Europa dagegen zu einer Nachfragestimulierung, verbunden mit einer kontinuierlichen Herabsetzung des Diskontsatzes. Die EWG-L?nder sind, da sie ihre Politik nicht koordinieren, nach einigen Jahren wegen Zahlungsbilanzschwierigkeiten zu einer kontraktiven Nachfragepolitik gezwungen. (ii) Koordinierte Strategien best?tigen, da\ nicht-synchronisierte Politiken die Weltwirtschaft stabilisieren k?nnen. (in) Kooperation verbessert die wirtschaftlichen Leistungen, ausgedrückt in den Wachstumsraten und den Zahlungsbilanzen. Allerdings erbringt die ausdrückliche Zusammenarbeit kaum noch zus?tzliche Vorteile zu denen, die bereits im Rahmen der vollen Koordinierung erreicht werden k?nnen.

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Resumen Estrategias coordinadas de cooperación económica entre Europa y los EEUU.- La aplicación de un modelo dinámico de teoría de juegos a la coordinatión de política económica entre los EEUU y la CEE, como parte de un modelo altamente agregado de la economía mundial, permite concluír en este trabajo que (i) políticas que ignoran la influencia de medidas tomadas en otros países dan lugar a una contractión fiscal y a una menor interventión del Gobierno en los EEUU, pero a una estimulación de la demanda combinada con reducciones continuas de la tasa de descuento en Europa; al seguir políticas descoordinadas los países de la CEE están obligados a contraer la demanda agregada al cabo de unos a?os, debido a los problemas de balance de pagos, (ii) estrategias coordinadas confirman que políticas no sincronizadas pueden estabilizar la economía mundial; (iii) la cooperación favorece a la economía en términos de tasas de crecimiento y balance de pagos. Sin embargo, los beneficios adicionales de una cooperatión explícita resultan marginales en comparación con los beneficios ya alcanzados por la solución con coordinación total.

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Résumé Stratégies coordonnées pour la coopération entre l’Europe et les E.U. - En appliquant la théorie dynamique de jeu à la coordination de politique entre les E.U. et la CEE dans un modèle fortement agrégé de l’économie mondiale, cet article arrive aux conclusions suivants: (i) La politique qui ignore l’influence des actions suivies dans d’autres économies mène à la réduction fiscale et à moins interventions gouvernementales dans les E.U., mais à une stimulation de la demande avec des réductions continuelles du taux d’escompte en Europe. En cas d’une politique pas coordonnée les pays CEE sont forcés à prendre des mesures pour freiner la demande agrégée après quelques années à cause des problèmes de la balance des paiements. (ii) La stratégie coordonnée confirme que des politiques pas synchronisées pourraient stabiliser l’économie mondiale. (iii) La coopération peut élever le taux de croissance et améliorer la balance des paiements. Cependant, les gains additionnels d’une coopération explicite sont petits en comparaison avec les bénéfices déjà gagnés à l’aide d’une solution complètement coordonne’e.

     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

The role and place of research and intellectual discourse in the reproduction of social relations of racial domination in South Africa

The South African research community which undertakes all research activity in the social and natural sciences, with and without state and corporate sponsorship, draws its membership mainly from the dominant social group. In this country, the dominant group is both economically and racially determined. Consequently, the white minority dominates the research community and intellectual discourse as it does other socio‐economic and political spheres of society. This situation guarantees the constant reproduction and perpetuation of the social relations of racial domination.

As an agent that generates knowledge and new ideas, research as an academic and intellectual tool of enquiry is an instrument of social control, producing new concepts, language and theoretical abstractions which are not accessible to those outside its multi‐farious disciplines. Insofar as the largest proportion of practitioners of these specialised disciplines is drawn from the dominant group, research has itself become a pivotal part of the dominant ideology. Its role is inevitably and inextricably bound up with the processes of systematic reproduction of the relations of domination.

The aim of this viewpoint is therefore to explore various ways in which research bodies and intellectual discourse in general in South Africa can be deracialised and be made more representative of the social make‐up of society.     

Struggling to save our kids

Many more than ever face the crises of childhood: violence, drugs, bad schools, poverty, divorce, or two parents at work. And no one seems to care.     

Country size and ‘insulation’ from external disturbances

Summary This paper considers the relationship between economic size and vulnerability to external disturbances. In order to analyze this issue effectively a model comprising three different-sized economies is constructed. The issue of economic size and insulation is approached from this alternative perspectives depending upon the relative size of (a) the `recipient' country and (b) the transmitting country. The results of the analysis indicate that, contrary to popular belief, a small country under floating exchange rates is less severely affected by external economic events than a large economy regardless of the type of external disturbance and the degree of domestic wage indexation.This paper has been improved by the helpful comments of a referee. We alone are solely responsible for all remaining errors.