The Impact of Middle Manager Training on Productivity: A Test on Italian Companies

This paper presents panel evidence on the productivity effects of middle managers’ off‐the‐job formal training in Italy. It is based on a rich and reliable panel dataset covering all sectors of the Italian economy over the period 2006–2011. We employ panel data techniques and self‐selection models to show that off‐the‐job formal training for middle management has a significant nonlinear exogenous effect on total factor productivity. Moreover, results indicate that middle managers’ off‐the‐job formal training is more effective in larger firms and that different training methods have heterogeneous effects on productivity.     

An Explicit Mapping of Currency Target Zone Models to Option Prices*

Currency target zones have been under scrutiny for the past three decades, which led to the development of two broad classes of quantitative models: Phenomenological ones that explicitly take into consideration the market's perception of the bounded exchange rate, and more mechanical ones that rely on put and call options. Until now, the two models have only been compared qualitatively. Here, we derive, for the first time, a quantitative link between these two approaches. Specifically, we show how the former approach has to be generalized in order to recover the second one. This mapping lets us relate the phenomenological parameter of the first approach to economically well‐known quantities.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Business cycle convergence and trade: Brazil and China in a changing world

The recent economic interaction between Latin America and Asia, particularly between Brazil and China, has attracted the attention of the academic world that seeks to understand the effects of this approach in terms of business cycle convergence, economic structure and development trajectory. This paper contributes to this debate, presenting new evidence about the type and quality of this relationship. Our results reveal that Brazil and China present different patterns of relationship between trade and productive specialization: while Brazil has an intra-industry trade pattern, China has an inter-industry trade pattern. We explore some normative implications and future research possibilities.     

Spatial agglomeration and firm exit: a spatial dynamic analysis for Italian provinces

The paper investigates the effect of spatial agglomeration on firm exit in a dynamic framework. Using a large dataset at the industry-province level for Italy (1998–2007), we estimate a spatial dynamic panel model via a GMM estimator and analyze the short-run impact of specialization and variety on firm exit. Specialization negatively affects firm exit rates in the short-run. The effect is particularly significant for low-tech firms. The impact of variety on firm mortality rates at the industry level is instead less clear, although still negative and significant for low-tech firms.     

Sportsbooks and politicians: Place your bet!

Betting on sports is widespread. Book making can be profitable but the practice is illegal in the United States. The internet allows this activity to move to offshore locations like Costa Rica. The internet also lowers entry barriers and makes pricing more transparent which could lead to hyper competition. Using odds for four World Cup soccer games the case reader can calculate the expected profitability for several bookies (sportsbooks). Price dispersion does not disappear with the internet, even for gambling which entails no movement of merchandise. Strategy is important. Sportsbooks must decide on segments, product mix and geographic scope.     

Deregulation with consensus

We analyze the problem of eliminating an inefficient regulation, such as protection, in a dynamic model in which there is incomplete information and unanimous approval from all parties involved is necessary. Existing firms have heterogeneous cost, and efficiency requires some of them to shut down when the inefficient regulation is eliminated. The government can set up a revelation mechanism, giving subsidies and requiring firms to exit the market at a given time depending on the information collected. Under full commitment the optimal policy prescribes that some inefficient firms remain active and are subsidized. The optimal policy takes a simple form, with at most two times at which the firms are allowed to exit. We are very grateful to Matt Mitchell whose comments substantially improved the paper.     

Production and financial linkages in inter-firm networks: structural variety, risk-sharing and resilience

The paper analyzes how (production and financial) inter-firm networks can affect firms’ default probabilities and observed default rates. A simple theoretical model of shock transfer is built to investigate some stylized facts on how firm-idiosyncratic shocks are allocated in the network, and how this allocation changes firm default probabilities. The model shows that the network works as a perfect “risk-pooling” mechanism, when it is both strongly connected and symmetric. But the “risk-sharing” does not necessarily reduce default rates, unless the shock firms face is lower on average than their financial capacity. Conceived as cases of symmetric inter-firm networks, industrial districts might have a comparative disadvantage in front of heavy crises.