Applying importance sampling for estimating coherent credit risk contributions

A Monte Carlo simulation method based on importance sampling is applied to the problem of determining individual risk contributions of the obligors in a credit portfolio. The effectiveness of the method is benchmarked against standard Monte Carlo techniques and the asymptotic optimality of the method is proved. The risk measure adopted is expected shortfall, a particualr coherent risk measure. The concept of a coherent risk spectrum is discussed on the basis of some numerical examples.     

Technological Profiles And Economic Performance In The Italian Manufacturing Sector ∗

This paper applies multivariate analysis to a rich data set on technological innovation, in order to identify typical patterns of technological change. To single out the dominant forms of technological behaviour, twelve variables have been selected approximating firms' technological sources and innovation results. Multivariate analysis was applied to identify six main clusters or dominant technological profiles. Each cluster was then interpreted on the basis of a larger set of variables concerning firms' technological and economic performance. The results confirm recent emphasis placed by scholars of technical change on variety of bchaviour in technical change and industrial organization and, more specifically, Pavitt's seminal attempt at a classification of this variety. However, our clusters are somewhat more numerous than Pavitt's, thus showing a more complex combination of technological input and output. Moreover, representative industries of each cluster are less easily recognized as a less marked sectoral characterization of clusters emerges. The latter result seems to imply that variety in technological change is also shown by the existence of different technological trajectories and strategies within the same sector. We suggest that the diffuse nature of recent technical change has given firms greater freedom of strategic choice among different technological strategies.     

Bertrand competition when firms hold passive ownership stakes in one another

We show that the Bertrand oligopoly model with cost asymmetries may admit multiple Nash equilibria when firms hold passive ownership stakes in each other. The equilibrium price may be as high as the monopoly price of the most efficient firm.     

Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints

We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation. We gratefully acknowledge comments by Marco Battaglini, Benny Moldovanu and participants at seminars held at Montreal, Yale, Texas A&M, Washington St. Louis and at the Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints held at SUNY - Stony Brook. Sandro Brusco acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias D.G.E.S., proyecto SEC2001-0445.     

THE TRANSMISSION OF THE MONETARY POLICY IN THE EURO AREA: THE ROLE OF THE BANKS’ BUSINESS MODEL

This paper sheds some new light on the incidence of the banks’ business model as a component of the bank lending channel in the euro area. Differently from existing literature, the analysis is led on the basis of the two main macroeconomic regions that today characterize the euro area: its north‐east (German‐centric) and south‐west halves. The observation period is 2008–2013, mainly featured by the financial and economic crisis. The empirical findings evidence that in the north‐east half of the euro area the cooperative banks leveraged the effects of the reduction in the interest rates in terms of new lending. In this respect, they differentiated from commercial and savings banks, which showed a more neutral impact on the transmission of the monetary policy decisions. These results highlight the distinctive role of the cooperative banks in terms of credit provision in Germany and in the whole north‐east half of the euro area. Nevertheless, this cooperative banking effect did not emerge for the south‐west half of the continent, particularly hit by the crisis. This may suggest that the bank's business model tend to be neutral to the transmission of the monetary policy in economies characterized by prolonged recessions.     

Bankruptcy, Takeovers, and Wage Contracts

Takeovers give raiders the opportunity of breaking implicit contracts inside the firm. If implicit contracts are adopted by workers and management to reach more efficient outcomes, then the possibility of takeovers may cause a welfare loss. We show that, under some conditions, this argument can go through even if the firm and the workers can write explicit and complete contracts. The crucial assumption is that the profitability of the firm is linked to its financial situation, in the sense that a firm which has a high probability of bankruptcy will face fewer opportunities than a financially solid firm. In this framework, the possibility of takeovers imposes constraints on the set of feasible employment contracts, leading to inefficient outcomes.     

EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

We characterize incentive‐efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand‐alone value and a component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when transfers can, and cannot, be made contingent on the value of any new firm. When they can, we show that redistributing shares of any nonmerging firm generates information rents and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. When they cannot, private information undermines efficiency more when it concerns stand‐alone values than synergies. Here, acquisitions emerge as optimal mechanisms.     

Technological change and the vertical organization of industries

The vertical scope of a firm, that is, which components or segments of the production processes are kept in–house and which are outsourced, is variously considered as depending on cost and/or technological conditions. Most of the literature focuses on the incentives for an individual firm facing exogenous competition and technological opportunities. In this paper we consider the problem from the perspective of the whole industry: in what respect does firm organizational behavior depend on the industry technological evolution and aggregate structure, and how does innovation and organizational behavior affect the industry structure. We build an evolutionary simulation model of an industry where competitors decide the number of internally produced components. We relate the industry average value of market outsourcing to the technological conditions prevalent in the industry. The results from the model shed light on a number of (apparently) contradictory suggestions in the economic and management literature.     

Growing like mushrooms? Sectoral evidence from four large European economies

This paper follows a stream of literature on the empirics of sectoral growth rates, originated by Castaldi and Dosi (Income levels and income growth. Some new cross-country evidence and some interpretative puzzles. LEM Working Paper 2004-18, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy, 2004) on two-digit international manufacturing and service sectors, and by Sapio and Thoma’s (The growth of industrial sectors: theoretical insights and empirical evidence from U.S. manufacturing. LEM Working Paper 2006-09, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy, 2006) study on four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries. Our aim is to discuss the statistical properties of growth rates in light of a ’mushroom vision’ of growth. In our analysis, we focus on the growth of value added in NACE five-digit sectors in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom between 1995 and 2003. We find that the volatility of sectoral growth rates is negatively correlated with sectoral size, according to a power law, but with steeper slopes than for firms and U.S. sectors. Rescaled sectoral growth rates are well-described by a Laplace distribution in most years. The outcomes of this statistical analysis provide a further empirical foundation to a view of sectoral growth, wherein inter-firm correlations, market concentration, and inter-sectoral feedbacks play a major role.     

Modelling insurgent-incumbent dynamics: Vector autoregressions,multivariate Markov chains,and the nature of technological competition

The struggle between sail and steam is a long-standing theme in economic history. But this technological competition story has only partly tackled, since most studies have appreciated the rivalry between the two alternative modes of commercial sea carriage in the late 19th century while the early period has remained relatively under-analysed. This paper models the early dynamics between the two capital goods using a vector autoregression approach (VAR) and a Multivariate Markov Chain approach (MMC). We find evidence that the relationship was non-linear, with a strong indication of complementarities and cross-technology learning effects.