DATA REVISION AND MARKET RESPONSE: THE CASE OF UNITED STATES TRADE BALANCE ANNOUNCEMENTS†

ABSTRACT In this paper we study economic news, as reflected in the announcements of the United States trade balance by the Commerce department, to illustrate the importance of revised data versus preliminary data to economic agents. A new methodology has been developed here to study how agents in the exchange market respond to these monthly trade balance announcements and consequently, move the dollar's exchange rate. In contrast to previous studies where agent reactions to only preliminary trade figures were analyzed, this method is applied to examine market reactions to the preliminary and revised trade balance figures.     

The covariates of regularity in purchase timing

An examination of the timing of consumers' purchases for coffee reveals that consumers vary a great deal in terms of the regularity of their purchasing behavior. Some consumers make purchases at seemingly random time intervals, while others purchase at highly regular intervals. The measurement of regularity in purchase timing, as well as the identification of its covariates, is important in many contexts such as modeling purchase incidence and sales forecasting. We measure the degree of regularity among a sample of coffee purchasers and identify several consumer characteristics that vary with the degree of regularity in purchase timing. Results show that regularity in purchase timing is related to brand loyalty, store loyalty and deal proneness, as well as to certain pattern of routinization by the households, and that regularity may be used, along with other aspects of purchase behavior, to provide a basis for market segmentation.The authors wish to acknowledge the support of Information Resources Inc. for providing the data, and are grateful to Professor Jane T. Landwehr, University of Delaware, for her help.     

Tests of functional form in dynamic econometric models: Some empirical experience

Econometric theory has provided several rival tests of functional form specifications in economic relations, but there is little empirical experience in using many of them. This note reports some practical applications, and compares the performance of various tests, in specifying dynamic econometric models.     

Trade and expropriation

We examine the effect of international trade on expropriation in a setting where law enforcement is costly. We show that, in general equilibrium, trade liberalization can reduce expropriation activities and have a first-order effect on the gains from trade. One interpretation of our results is that unskilled-labor abundant countries facing popular militia or rebel groups will experience amplified gains from trade, as expropriation levels and cost of enforcement decline with trade liberalization. However, the model also admits the possibility that globalization causes an increase in crime, particularly for skilled-labor abundant countries.     

Does IPO Pricing Reflect Public Information? New Insights from Equity Carve‐Outs

We examine the efficiency of initial public offering (IPO) pricing using a sample of over 300 equity carve‐outs from 1985 to 2009. The partial adjustment theory posits that the initial return of IPOs is predictable based on private information, but public information is fully incorporated. Prospect theory is consistent with both private and public information not being fully incorporated in the offer price. Our analysis confirms that both price update and initial return of carve‐out IPOs can be predicted based on the parent firm's returns during the prepricing and preissuing periods. Further, postissue ownership of the parent firm is associated with significantly higher price update and initial return, while IPOs where the majority of the proceeds are paid out register lower initial return. The size of the subsidiary and relative size of the offering are also significantly related to price update and initial return. These findings are consistent with prospect theory.     

Why Disability Mainstreaming is Good for Business: A New Narrative

Journal of Business Ethics - In developed economies, powerful legislative and regulatory frameworks, for people with disability (PWD) over the last five decades, have provided major motivation for...     

On the Determinants of REIT Capital Structure: Evidence from around the World

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Using a sample of REITs from twelve countries around the world, we examine the determinants of REIT capital structure. We investigate...     

Endogeneity in survey research

Endogeneity is a crucial problem in survey-based empirical research on marketing strategy (MS) and inter-organizational relationships (IORs); if not addressed, it can cause researchers to arrive at flawed conclusions and to offer poor advice to practitioners. Although the field is increasingly cognizant of endogeneity-related issues, many authors fail to properly address it, particularly in survey-based research. Emphasizing the role of essential heterogeneity, this article develops an overarching framework to help improve the understanding of endogeneity problems and how to tackle them when researchers use cross-sectional survey-based data. The authors provide explanations of and advice for how MS and IOR researchers can address six “painful” and sometimes hidden decisions: 1) Do you have an endogeneity problem? 2) What technique/estimator is appropriate? 3) What instrumental variables (IVs) should be chosen? 4) How should IVs be evaluated empirically? 5) How should the results be interpreted and evaluated? and 6) What results should you report? The authors provide a practical flowchart to guide researchers in their efforts to address endogeneity-related concerns.     

Corruption,market quality,and entry deterrence in emerging economies

In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India.