铬渣的无害化处理和综合利用

铬渣产量大、毒性剧烈,是严重污染生态环境和危害人类健康的危险废物.本文介绍了铬渣各种无害化处理方法的解毒机理、工艺过程和应用实践,阐述了对铬渣进行综合利用的途径,并就铬渣的防治措施提出了建议.     

Debt Issue Costs and Issue Characteristics in the Market for U.S. Dollar Denominated International Bonds

This paper analyzes the issue costs and initial pricing of bonds in the international market. In particular, we investigate the determinants of three components of issue costs: underwriter fee, underwriter spread (the difference between the offering price and the guaranteed price to the issuer), and underpricing (the difference between the market price and the offering price). Total underwriter compensation increases with the bonds' credit risk and maturity, but it is insignificantly related to issue size. Interestingly, underwriters appear to price some issue characteristics directly (by adjusting the fee) and other characteristics indirectly (by setting the guaranteed price). The two compensation components (fee and spread) are negatively related to each other. We provide evidence that this trade-off is consistent with income tax considerations, as well as with two-tier pricing by underwriters. We find no evidence of underpricing.     

关于网络环境下工业工程应用研究的思考

分析传统IE应用现状 ,探讨国内企业与发达国家企业相比在传统IE应用方面存在差距的原因 ,提出缩小差距的解决方略 ,阐明网络环境下IE应用研究重点等。     

论道德教育方法的特点及其在思想政治工作中的作用

本文从道德教育方法的科学性、艺术性、说理性三大特点出发探讨该方法在思想政治工作中的作用.     

Regional economic performance in China1

This paper investigates convergence patterns among China's provinces using GDP data for the period 1952–97. We analyze convergence behaviour on the basis of Markov chains proposed by Quah (1993 ) and the generalized entropy decomposition proposed by Shorrocks (1980, 1984 ). Both sets of results show similar evidence of convergence within the pre‐defined geo‐economic sub‐regions, but no evidence is found of convergence between the sub‐regions. This finding has important policy implications for regional economic development in China. JEL classification: C33, E20, O47.     

由联想改制看高层长期激励

联想是较早在我国实施股票期权制度的企业,也是运用最成功的范例之一。联想董事长柳传志曾多次说过“如果没有实施股权激励,联想的接班就不会这么顺利”。这句话的确意义深刻,因为受益的不仅是企业及企业高层,当然也包括柳传志本人。从褚时建到李经纬再到柳传志,任何人都无法否认柳传志是最幸运的退居二线的企业家。因为他有联想1000万股股票,足以使他在退下来后,潇洒自如地或挥杆高尔夫绿茵场上;或闲情逸致漫步异国他乡。而前两位却不幸成为了“59现象”的代表。“股票期权”与联想模式在我国实施股票期权的确障碍多多,因为很多制度、法律…     

落实“四到户”需争取政策支持—访河北省栾城县供电局局长胡宝玉

前不久,河北省栾城县委、县政府"两办"共同制定了<栾城县农村生活用水参考管理办法>,并发出通知,建议各村民委员会采取措施,加强水费的收缴和管理工作,改变目前村民吃水、用水、缴纳水费不规范的现状.了解内情的人都知道,这项<管理办法>的出台,是县供电局在背后争取和推动的结果.     

Intraday Lead-Lag Relationships Between the Futures-, Options and Stock Market

In rational, efficiently functioning and complete markets, returns on derivative and underlying securities should be perfectly contemporaneously correlated. Due to market imperfections, one of these markets may reflect information faster. The use of high-frequency data and the choice for a small unit time interval to measure these lead-lag relations comes at the cost of some or many missing observations, causing traditional estimators to either under- or overestimate covariances and correlations. We use a new estimator to estimate lead-lag relationships between the cash AEX index, options and futures. We find that futures returns lead both options and cash index returns by approximately 10 minutes. The relationship between options and the cash market is not completely unidirectional.     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.     

A MODEL OF BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION*

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and “lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model.