Transferable quotas,enforcement costs and typical firms: An empirical application to the Norwegian trawler fleet

An alternative to traditional regulations of fisheries to avoid rent dissipation is the use of individual transferable quotas (ITQ _s ) where prices in the quota market provide the necessary information to owners of harvest rights to contract with each other. However, even under such a decentralized regime, information on the underlying technology of the fishing vessels is also necessary. First, since most fisheries consist of many interrelated production processes, in order to avoid rent dissipation by discarding wrong output mix etc., the structure of production in the multispecies fishery must be known to design a proper quota system. Second, an ITQ system may create incentives for misreporting by understating the actual catch. This may especially be the case where the expected degree of self-enforcement is low. The paper proposes a way to reduce the information requirements under regulation with asymmetric information by constructing a typical firm and comparing performance for the other vessels to this firm. Based on the typical firm, and if the industry is relatively homogenous, the performance and hence catch of any other firm in the industry can be predicted within a certain range. Further, the paper applies this idea to the Norwegian trawler fleet to assess the production structure in terms of jointness, input-output separability, and the supply and demand elasticities for the fishing firms. This information characterizes the fishery and thus how the quota system may be designed and how to construct a yardstick in order to reduce the enforcement cost under a decentralized regulation of ITQs.The authors would like to thank Trond Bjørndal, Røgnvaldur Hannesson, Ola Flaaten and two referees for useful comments and suggestions.     

Cuts,collaboration and creativity

Massive cuts in public spending are demanding a new era of collaborative working among partners in English local governance. Partnerships have the capacity to pool assets, share scarce resources and leverage new forms of social and human capital. City-wide partnerships are also ideal vehicles for public service creativity. Action research in Sheffield reveals the potential, but also the pitfalls, of attempts to mainstream partnership principles, now they are no longer mandated by central government.     

Sustainable fisheries development in the tropics: trawlers and licence limitation in Malaysia

Sustainable fisheries development requires sound fisheries management. Area licence limitation programmes may form the cornerstone for most tropical multispecies fisheries management programmes. An empirical analysis of Peninsular Malaysian fishing trawlers is used to design an area licence limitation programme that conforms to the multiproduct production technology, and cost and revenue structures to best accommodate condtions of asymmetric information between the regulator and fishing vessels.     

Fewer Fish for Higher Profits? Price Response and Economic Incentives in Global Tuna Fisheries Management

This paper evaluates industry-wide economic incentives arising from changes in product prices in an industry exploiting a common renewable resource (tropical tunas) that is regulated via output limits. Changes in prices alter economic incentives by affecting revenues, profits, conservation, and nonmarket public benefits. Economic incentives in industries exploiting common resources have been examined from multiple angles. However, industry level variation in market prices arising from changes in public regulation has not been explored. We analyse the impact on economic incentives due to changes in output limits and market prices through estimation of ex-vessel price and scale flexibilities for imported skipjack and yellowfin in Thailand’s cannery market. The unitary scale flexibility, estimated from the General Synthetic Inverse Demand Systems, indicates no loss in revenue and even potential profit increases resulting from lower harvest levels that could arise from lower catch limits. However, for a revenue neutral or positive outcome to be achieved, the three inter-governmental tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, which manage the majority of the yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, would have to coordinate multilaterally to set the catch limits for both species.     

MEASUREMENT OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION FOR REVENUE-MAXIMIZING FIRMS*

A dual measure of capacity utilization is developed for multiproduct, revenue-maximizing firms. Under the assumption of revenue maximization, the sensitivity of CU to a change in an individual product price is shown to be directly related to the product-specific scale elasticity. The results are given a simple graphical interpretation.