Weather Risk, Wages in Kind, and the Off-Farm Labor Supply of Agricultural Households in a Developing Country

This article investigates the effects of weather risk on the off-farm labor supply of agricultural households in a developing country, distinguishing different types of off-farm labor markets. A multivariate two-limit tobit model is applied to data from India. The regression results show that the share of the off-farm labor supply increases with weather risk, the increase is much larger in the case of nonagricultural work than in the case of agricultural wage work, and the increase is much larger in the case of agricultural wages paid in kind than in the cash wage case, suggesting farmers' considerations of food security.     

Interregional Interdependence and Regional Economic Growth: An Interregional Input-Output Analysis of the Kyushu Region

The main objective of this paper is to examine the effects of the changes in economic conditions and government policies on the output growth of the Kyushu region between 1965 and 1990. This study uses the extended growth-factor decomposition method based on a three-region Japanese interregional input-output system consisting of Kyushu, Kanto, and the rest of Japan. The growth pattern of Kyushu changed noticeably over the period. The primary drivers of growth changed from the expansion of final demand within Kyushu to direct and indirect effects from outside Kyushu. This unambiguously indicates that Kyushu has facilitated interregional and international interdependence. The emergence of the processing and assembling sector, together with the construction of new networks of trunk railway lines, expressways, and communications, promoted closer interregional industrial linkages between Kyushu, Kanto, and the rest of Japan. In addition, the offshore transfer of production from Kyushu to Southeast Asia after the Plaza Accord Agreement strengthened Kyushu's international industrial linkages.     

Dynamic stability of an open city with many household classes

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability property of an “open” city with many classes of households. We specify a dynamic adjustment process of household movement into and out of the city in such a way that the number of households in each class increases or decreases over time, according as the utility level households can obtain in the city is higher or lower than a certain utility level attainable elsewhere. Then we prove that a long-run equilibrium is locally stable for positive speeds of adjustment under reasonable assumptions. Some comparative static properties are also explored.     

An application of the LeChatelier principle in location theory

An application of the LeChatelier principle in the field of location theory, particularly focusing on the effect of a change in the opportunity cost of land on the location of the outer boundary of a circular city with many industries, is demonstrated. It is shown that the effect on the outer city boundary will be greater, as more boundaries between industries inside the city are allowed to vary in response to a change in the opportunity cost of land.     

The golden rule of urban transportation investment

The purpose of this paper is to find an optimal taxation rule for transportation investment in an ever growing urban economy. First we dynamize a standard circular-city model with identical residents by introducing population growth and transportation improvements over time. Assuming that utility functions are of a constant-elasticity form and transportation investment is financed by an income tax, we prove the existence, uniqueness and stability of a balanced growth equilibrium for each given tax rate. Then, an optimal tax rate is determined so as to maximize the balanced growth equilibrium level of utility for every resident in the city. It is also shown that our simple rule remains valid in the case of two income classes.     

Structural Changes and Regional Income Inequality in Indonesia: A Bidimensional Decomposition Analysis*

Using the bidimensional decomposition method of a population‐weighted coefficient of variation, this paper analyzes the changes in the determinants of interprovincial income inequality associated with structural changes in Indonesia from 1983 to 2004. The method unifies two inequality decompositions by regional groups and gross regional product components (industrial sectors) and, therefore, enables us to assess the contributions of gross regional product components to within‐region and between‐region inequalities, as well as to overall inequality. As the share of mining has decreased, the spatial distribution of manufacturing has played a more important role in the inequality of Sumatra and Kalimantan, while the primacy of Jakarta, with strong urbanization economies, facilitated by globalization and trade and financial liberalization, has determined much of the Java–Bali region's inequality and, therefore, overall inequality in Indonesia.     

Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the policymakers implement emission tax policies simultaneously or sequentially crucially depends on the magnitude of environmental damages. When the damages are insignificant, the tax rates are strategic substitutes, and the simultaneous-move policymaking emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when the damages are significant, the tax rates are strategic complements, and sequential-move policymaking emerges. We also extend the model by allowing for differences in the vulnerability to environmental damages between countries. When the differences are large, the unique equilibrium of the game is the situation where the less vulnerable country acts as a leader. In the case where multiple equilibrium emerges, the risk-dominant equilibrium is also that where the less vulnerable country leads.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.