Country Market Sequential Order-of-Entry: A Learning Effects Approach

ABSTRACT

In this article, we identify and describe the sequential order-of-entry problem. The sequential order-of-entry problem arises when, after having identified a desirable set of country markets to enter, firms are unable (because of budgetary constraints), or unwilling (because of possible learning or strategic issues), to enter all at once. The question then arises whether some sequences to entering the desirable set of country markets are better than others? Answering this question is shown to be nontrivial. The article outlines a number of arguments for the existence of superior sequences to entering a set of desirable country markets, and develops normative and dynamic frameworks to aid in the identification and evaluation of sequences.     

Do Analysts Matter for Corporate Tax Planning? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

We exploit an exogenous shock to analyst coverage as a result of brokerage house mergers and closures to examine whether financial analysts influence the tax‐planning activities of the firms they cover. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that, on average, firms affected by broker mergers and/or closures experience a reduction in their GAAP (cash) effective tax rates (ETR) of 2.5 percent (2.6 percent), relative to control firms, translating into average tax expense (cash tax) savings of $34 ($35) million. The treatment effect is more pronounced among firms with lower pre‐event analyst coverage. To explore how analysts affect tax planning, we further document that the treatment effect is greater among firms that lose an analyst who provided an implied ETR forecast in the past, suggesting that analysts influence tax planning via their tax‐specific research efforts. In addition, we find that after merger/closure, weakly governed firms increase their use of aggressive tax strategies, and financially distressed firms experience a larger reduction of cash effective tax rates, relative to control firms. Overall, we provide evidence that a shock to analyst coverage sufficiently changes the cost‐benefit trade‐off of tax planning.     

Discussion of “Target's Tax Shelter Participation and Takeover Premiums”

Chow, Klassen, and Liu ( 2016 ), hereafter CKL, examine whether M&A bidding firms are willing to pay more for target firms that disclose they have not participated in a “tax shelter” sometime in the past. My discussion provides an overview of the past and current tax literature in accounting and places CKL within this expanding literature. I then provide a critique of this interesting and well‐executed study that exploits an unusual disclosure to examine tax shelter participation effects.     

The lead–lag relationship between equities and stock index futures markets around information releases

This paper documents a strengthening in the lead of stock index futures returns over stock index returns around macroeconomic information releases. Some evidence of a strengthening in feedback from the equities market to the futures market and weakening in the lead of the futures market around major stock‐specific information releases is also provided. This is consistent with the hypothesis that investors with better marketwide information prefer to trade in stock index futures while investors with stock‐specific information prefer to trade in underlying stocks. A small weakening in the contemporaneous relationship between stock index futures returns and stock index returns around both types of releases is also documented. This is consistent with disintegration in the relationship between the two markets associated with noise induced volatility. One by‐product of this study is new comparative evidence on the performance of adjustments for infrequent trading of index stocks based on a commonly used ARMA technique versus recalculation of the stock index using quote midpoints. The results suggest that the quote midpoint index performs at least as well as the ARMA adjusted index across the entire sample period, as well as around the different types of information releases. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 20:467–487, 2000     

Are fully independent audit committees really necessary?

Accounting scandals and concerns about the quality of financial statements have led to many calls for improved audit committee effectiveness. Prior research indicates that audit committee independence is positively related to effective oversight of the financial reporting process. Unfortunately, prior research has not provided an answer as to how much independence on the audit committee is enough. This is an important unanswered question because while Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) currently requires all listed companies to maintain an audit committee that is 100% independent there has been much debate regarding easing the SOX requirements for smaller and foreign companies. In this paper we examine whether the regulatory requirements of a completely independent audit committee are necessary to obtain the monitoring benefits related to audit committee independence that have been documented in prior literature. Our results suggest that the benefits of audit committee independence are consistently achieved only when the audit committee is completely independent. These results provide support for the SOX requirement of 100% independent audit committees.     

Venture capitalist monitoring: Evidence from governance structures

We examine the impact of venture capitalist (VC) involvement, quality and exit on corporate governance structures at the time of and subsequent to an initial public offering (IPO). Venture capital backed firms utilize governance structures with greater levels of monitoring at the time of an IPO compared to non-backed firms, but this difference begins to dissipate over time. While short-lived, IPOs backed by high quality VCs have greater overall monitoring levels than those IPOs backed by low quality VCs. IPOs backed by high quality VCs use significantly more equity-based compensation than their low quality counterparts. Finally, the exit of a VC materially alters the governance structure of firms. Measures of governance decline following the departure of a venture capital firm. Overall, the presence of a venture capitalist affects governance structures of firms both at the IPO and through the early years as public firms.