Ist die EU-Agrarpolitik ihr Geld wert?

Expenditure for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has been in the centre of recent policy debate in the preparation of the Financial Framework for the period 2014–2020. Expenditure has generally been considered as the necessary costs for the achievement of the CAP objectives. The authors of this article argue that expenditure is not equal to the economic costs of a policy. Moreover, they claim that the main part of CAP expenditure is not well targeted for the achievement of the CAP’s objectives. The bulk of expenditure is for direct payments tied to agricultural land and, hence, contributes little if anything to CAP’s objectives as laid down in the treaties of the European Union or officially articulated elsewhere.     

The Research Field “Modeling Business Information Systems”

The research field “Modeling business information systems” has a long tradition in the scientific discipline of Business and Information Systems Engineering (BISE). The present paper highlights research shaping the research field, discusses challenges impairing the development of the research field in the coming years, and outlines elements of a future research agenda.     

Do Vietnamese upland farmers benefit from high world market prices for maize?

For rural households in the north of Vietnam, maize cropping is the main source of income. In the face of the world market price increases of the recent past, we analyze the regional marketing chain of this commodity qualitatively and econometrically investigating to what extent smallholder farmers in developing countries are affected by international price movements. Vietnamese maize markets are found to be well integrated. Recent price hikes have fully transmitted along the regional supply chain so that farmers profited. Nevertheless, adverse factors such as increasing input prices have neutralized these benefits resulting in a decline in real income of smallholders.     

Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of R&D.