Jointly Optimal Taxes and Enforcement Policies in Response to Tax Evasion

Assuming the government cannot fully observe either individual types or incomes and jointly picks optimal taxes and audit policies against evasion can significantly alter standard results from optimal income taxation and tax‐evasion models, which treat these separately. We consider this when individuals differ in their risk preferences and incomes. Given the resulting complexity, supplementing analytic results with numerical analysis helps explain the structure of the resulting policies and how they change when the distribution of income or the revenue requirements of the government change. We do this analysis with and without audit errors and with incomes exogenous or affected by occupational choice.     

Evaluation Periods and Asset Prices in a Market Experiment

We test whether the frequency of feedback information about the performance of an investment portfolio and the flexibility with which the investor can change the portfolio influence her risk attitude in markets. In line with the prediction of myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)), we find that more information and more flexibility result in less risk taking. Market prices of risky assets are significantly higher if feedback frequency and decision flexibility are reduced. This result supports the findings from individual decision making, and shows that market interactions do not eliminate such behavior or its consequences for prices.     

On the term structure of interest rates

The paper presents a valuation formula for default free bonds for a certain class of tastes when the instantaneously riskfree rate of interest follows a geometric Wiener process. Properties of the resulting term structure of interest rates are studied, and an application of the analysis to the pricing of Treasury Bills is proposed.     

Price Competition Between Teams

This study uses an experimental approach to examine whether markets are sensitive to the internal incentive structure of the competitors. Toward this goal, we modeled the competitors in a price competition duopoly game as three-player teams. Each player simultaneously declares a bid (price) and the team whose total bid was lower won the competition and was paid accordingly. The losing team was paid nothing, and in case of a tie, each team was paid half its price. This duopoly game was studied under two conditions; a cooperative treatment in which the team's profit was divided equally amongst its members and a non-cooperative one in which each individual member was paid her own bid. Whereas the Nash equilibrium is for each player in either treatment to demand the minimal price possible, we predicted that convergence to the competitive price would be much faster in the cooperative treatment than in the non-cooperative one. The experimental results firmly confirmed this prediction.     

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SELECTION IN THE DAIRY HERD IN ISRAEL*

The paper reports a study of the operation of the breeding system in the milk herd in Israel. Basic notions in quantitative genetics are explained and incorporated in a simulation model which is used to illustrate and analyse the selection process. Particularly emphasised are the traits common to selection and other research and development effort; among them, search, limited information, and biological and technical constraints. Differential technical changes affected the structure of the milk producing industry and its measured productivity; these effects are discussed in the last part of the paper.     

On the cultural basis of gender differences in negotiation

We study how culture and social structure influence bargaining behavior across gender, by exploring the negotiation culture in matrilineal and patriarchal societies using data from a laboratory experiment and a natural field experiment. One interesting result is that in both the actual marketplace and in the laboratory bargaining game, women in the matrilineal society earn more than men, at odds with years of evidence observed in the western world. We find that this result is critically driven by which side of the market the person is occupying: female (male) sellers in the matrilineal (patriarchal) society extract more of the bargaining surplus than male (female) sellers. In the buyer role, however, we observe no significant differences across societies.     

Resolution of Uncertainty and Asset Prices: Why the Timing of Information Release Might be Relevant After All

The objective of this paper is to reexamine the effects of the timing of information releases on security prices. We extend Ross (1989) by allowing the timing of information releases to affect the martingale probabilities. We show that if the early release of information is expected to resolve part of the uncertainty about the economy wide shock, it will positively affect asset prices in general and, under some conditions, the price of the information generating firm will rise more than the price of other firms. Our results are consistent with puzzling empirical observations documented in both the accounting and financial economics literatures.