Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century1

In this article we develop new tools to survey the development of lending‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century. One finding is that free lending and extensive liquidity support against good collateral developed gradually after 1847, and was already a fact of life before Bagehot published Lombard Street. Another is that the extension of the Bank of England's lender‐of‐last‐resort function went along with a reduction of its exposure to default risks, in contrast with accounts that have associated lending of last resort with moral hazard. Finally, we provide a new interpretation of the ‘high rates’ advocated by Bagehot. We suggest they were meant to prevent banks from free‐riding on the safety offered by the central bank, and were aimed at forcing them to keep lending during crises so as to maintain a critical degree of liquidity in the money market.     

THE EFFECTS OF 1996 FARM LEGISLATION ON FEED AND FOOD GRAINS

The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 has been portrayed as a radical departure from the farm policies of the past 60 years. FAIR brought sweeping institutional changes to the basic price and income support programs, many of which had been in place since the 1930s. Close analysis reveals that many of the reforms of the FAIR Act are less revolutionary innovations and more continuations of reforms that began with the 1985 farm legislation and were extended by the 1990 farm bill. Nor should one believe that the changes will result, as some suggest, in large changes in crop acreages or have large effects on the year-to-year variability offarm revenues for these crops. In both cases, the changes in policies may be substantive, but their effective consequences are modest.     

STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE TURNAROUND PROCESS: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Early corporate turnaround theorists argued that strategic reorientations are central to the recovery process at many declining firms. However, subsequent large-sample empirical studies have reported that performance turnarounds for declining firms are primarily associated with cutback actions that increase efficiency, thus creating a gap between theory and empirical findings. We close this gap by presenting and empirically supporting a model proposing that the extent of strategic change initiated in a successful turnaround varies systematically with a declining firm’s need and capacity to reorient its strategy. Based on our model, we offer explanations for why past large-sample researchers were not able to verify the role of strategic change in the turnaround process and we reassert the adaptive role that strategic reorientations have in the turnaround attempts of declining firms with weak strategic positions. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Liquidity,Volume, and Order Imbalance Volatility

We examine the dynamics of liquidity using a comprehensive sample of U.S. stocks in the post-decimalization period. Motivated by a continuous-time inventory model, we compute a high-frequency measure of order imbalance volatility to proxy for the inventory risk faced by liquidity providers. We show that high-frequency order imbalance volatility is an important driver of liquidity and explains the often positive time-series relation between spread and volume for large stocks, which seems to run counter to most theoretical models. Furthermore, order imbalance volatility is priced in the cross-section of stock returns.